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1971)

Qui Tam Actions and the Rivers and
HarborsAct
Qui tam actions - which are private lawsuits brought under penal
statutes to recover lines provided therein - have been filed in recent
months by conservationists under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.
In each case, however, the court has denied the qui tam action, holding
that the Act does not authorize this mode of enforcement. This
Note examines the decisions and shows that they ignore several legal
principles that weigh in favor of the opposite result. The author makes
an extensive analysis of qui tam actions in general and then concludes
that qui tam actions should definitely be allowed under the Rivers and
HarborsAct.
I.

T

INTRODUCTION

to halt the destruction and degradation of our
environment and natural resources has prompted the enactment
of a substantial quantity of protective legislation." But two centuries of exponentially increasing industrialization have proven a
formidable opponent. In many cases, the greatest strides in protecting the environment have come not from the legislative or executive
HE STRUGGLE

1 Modern legislative enactments and administrative regulations designed to preserve
and protect the environment and natural resources include, inter alia: Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-68(d) (1964); Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 669(a)-(j) (1964); Migratory Bird Conservation Act, as amended 61 U.S.C. § 715(a)(s) (Supp. IV, 1969); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-823 (1964); Estuarine
Study Act of Aug. 3, 1968, 16 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. IV, 1969); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466(a)-(k) (1964), as amended Water Quality Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat 903; Appalachian Regional Development Act of March 9,
1965, 40 U.S.C. § 212 (Supp. IV, 1969); Water Resources Planning Act of July 22,
1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1962 (Supp. IV, 1969); National Water Commission Act of Sept. 26,
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 196 2(a) (Supp. IV, 1969); Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Star. 91; National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-190, 83 Star. 852; Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80
Star. 1246; Housing and Urban Development Act of Aug. 10, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89117, § 702, 79 Star. 451; Appalachian Regional Development Act of March 9, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-4, § 212, 79 Stat. 5, 16; Bureau of Outdoor Recreation Act of May 28,
1963, Pub. L. No. 88-29, 77 Stat 49; Delaware River Basin Compact Act of Sept. 27,
1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688; Exec. Order No. 11472, 3 C.F.R. 122 (1969V
Comp.), as amended Exec. Order No. 11514, 3 C.F.R. 104 (1970 Comp.); Exec. Order
No. 11288, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1966 Comp.), superseded by Exec. Order No. 11507, 3
C.F.R. 91 (1970 Comp.).
See generally H.R. REP. No. 421, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-18 (1970); CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMM. OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Qui TAM ACTIONS AND THE 1899 REFUSE ACT:
CITIZEN LAWSUITS AGAINST POLLUTERS OF THE NATION'S WATERWAYS 10 (Comm.
Print 1970); STAFF OF HOUSE CoMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AND ENVIRON-

MENTAL QUALITY passim (Comm. Print 1970); Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Brief,
app. B, Reuss v. Peter Cooper Corp., Civil No. 70-C-486 (E.D. Wisc. Feb. 23, 1971),
consolidated and dismissed for failure to state a claim, Reuss v. Moss-Am., Inc., 323 F.
Supp. 848 (E.D. Wisc. 1971).
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branches of the government, constrained as they, are by pressure
groups and self-interest, but rather from the judiciary. In order to
combat the "mind-forged manacles of law" which "have become the
favored shibboleths" 2 of government and corporate defendants,
attorneys and conservationists have followed two complementary approaches in the courts. On the one hand, recent years have seen
conservationists argue for the creation of new rights and far-reaching
theories;' on the other, they have argued for the expansion of existing theory, coupled with inventive statutory interpretations.4
Decades before man awakened to his crime of ecocide, the Congress of the United States enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899' which modified several antecedent statutes and was intended
primarily to protect commerce and trade by preventing the obstruction of navigable waterways.' Section 13 of this Act broadly pro2 J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION,

xi (1971) (Introduction by Sen. George McGovern) (See especially chapters 4-6).
3 Various legal theories which have been advanced include: (1) the development of
a constitutional right to a clean and decent environment, see, e.g., Environ. Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf, Civil No. 1694 [1 E.R.C. 1640] (D. Mont. filed Nov.
13, 1968); Fairfax County Fed'n of Citizens Ass'ns v. Hunting Towers Operating Co.,
Civil No. 4963-A (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 1, 1968); Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REV. 458 (1970); (2) the refinement of the doctrine
that citizens can force governmental agencies to meet procedural requirements, see, e.g.
District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Airis, 391 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
and (3) the development of the public trust doctrine, Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
See generally Peterson & Lawrence, The Challenge of Environmental Quality: An Outline of Remedies to Meet It, I ENVIRON. LAW 72 (1970).
4 See e.g., Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F. Supp. 1140 (1971) (Alleging, inter alia, an implied private right of action under section 13 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act); Ottinger v. Penn. Cent. Co., 68 Civ. 4353 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 13, 1970);
California v. Am. Cement Corp., Crim. No. 8262 (Just. Ct. filed May 13, 1970); Davis,
The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970); Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 CoLUM. L. REV. 734 (1970).
5
Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Star. 1151, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-20
(1964) (originally entitled, the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899). Sections 9-20 of the original act were substantive law sections and are commonly referred
to as the Rivers and Harbors Act. Sections 13, 16, and 17 of that Act, codified as 33
U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 412, and 413, respectively, are the sections most often involved in
litigation against polluters under the Act and are commonly designated by the title "Refuse Act." See HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, OUR WATERS AND
WETLANDS: How THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIR DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION, H.R. Doc. No. 917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-18 (1970); Hearings on S. 3575 Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Resources, and the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 80, at 1 (1970).
6 The scant legislative history of the Act is best detailed in United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (note especially the dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.,
at 493, and the lower court decision in the court of appeals, 264 F.2d 289 (7th Cit.
1959). See generally Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 426; Rivers and Harbors Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 191; Rivers and Harbors Act of 1880, 21 Stat. 180; H.R. REP.
No. 1826, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1899); H.R. DOC. No. 293, 54th Cong., 2d Sess.
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hibited any individual, corporation, municipality, or group from
throwing, discharging, or depositing "any refuse matter of any kind
or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state" into any navigable
waters of the United States; or a.tributary thereof.7 Then, in 1960,
the Supreme Court affirmed what. had become increasingly obvious,
that an essential function of section 13 was -to prevent the pollution
of America's -rivers an-d.lakes. 8 -In the decade since fhat decision,
passim (1897); S. REP. No. 224, 50th Cong., Ist ,Sess. 2 (1888); 32 Cong. Rec. 229698;2923 (1899); 21-CONG. REC. 8603;'8608, 8685, 8691, 9558 (1890).
733 U.S.C. §407 (1964) provides as follows:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or
procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship,
barge, or other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refus matter of ahy kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States, or into any tribuiary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be
washed into such. navigable water, and it shall not be lawful to deposit, or
cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material df any ktid in any place on the
bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable
water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water,
either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby
navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed: Provided, That n6thing
herein contained shall extend to, apply io, or prohibit the operations in connection with the improvement of navigable waters or construction of public work ,
considered necessary and proper by the United States officers supervising such
improvement or public work; And provided further, That the Secretary of the
Army, whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage or navigation will not be injured thereby, may 'permit the deposit of any material
ab6ve mentioned in navigable waters, within limits to be defined and under
conditions to be prescribed by him, provided application is made to him prior
to depositing such material, and whenever any permit is so granted the conditions thereof shall be strictly complied with, and any violation thereof shall be

--

unlawful.
8

United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); see Comment, Substantive and Remedial Problems in Preventing Interferences with Navigation: The Republic Steel Case, 59 CoLuM. L REv. 1065 (1959). This decision is most notable as
the first case to allow injunctive relief to the government under the Act, prohibiting the
discharge of industrial solids which settled out of suspension and created a shoaling
condition in the Calumet River. In dedding that the corporation's actions were not exempted by the phrase "refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that
flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state," found in section 13 (see note 7 supra), Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
The materials carried here are "industrial solids" as the District Court found.
The pardicles creating the present obstruction were in suspension, not in solution. Articles in suspension, such as organic matter in sewage, may undergo
chemical change. Others settle out All matter in suspension is not saved by
exception clause in § 13. Refuse flowing from "sewers" in a "liquid state"
means to us "sewage." . . . The fact that discharges from streets and sewers
may contain some articles in suspension that settle out and potentially
impair navigability [footnote omitted) is no reason for us to enlarge the group
to include these industrial discharges. We follow the line Congress has drawn
and cannot accept the invitation to broaden the exception in § 13 because
other matters "in a liquid state", might logically-have been treated as favorable
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the Supreme Court has been able to achieve a goal avoided by the
nation's legislators - it has created a weapon for combating water
pollution that is effective and expeditious." Unlike any of the laws
which modern Congresses have been able to enact, the Rivers and
Harbors Act contains specific enforcement provisions allowing for
the prompt incarceration or penalization of violators.'0
But not to be outdone, the executive branch of the government has
attempted to render the Act impotent by a series of maneuvers ranging from a blatant refusal to enforce its provisions to an ingenuous
permit program which will ultimately remove corporate polluters
from the ambit of the Act." Conservationists, angered by the Govas sewage is treated. We read the 1899 Act charitably in light of the purpose to be served. 362 U.S. at 490-91.
The Court's establishment in Republic of the need to interpret "refuse" in section 407
broadly has led to the eventual conclusion that nothing is exempted by that section save
municipal sewage. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966);
United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co. of Puerto Rico, 375 F.2d 631 (3d Cit. 1967);
United States v. Maplewood Poultry Co., 327 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Me. 1971).
The Government's interpretation of this section is reflected in part by 33 C.F.R. §
209.130(d) (2) (1971 Comp.); see also 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 594 (1897).
The Republic Court's broad definition of refuse applies irrespective of whether navigation is impeded thereby or not. It was long ago decided that the phrase "whereby
navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed" does not modify the first clause of
section 407 but rather only the second, which makes it unlawful to suffer material
to be in any way deposited on the bank of any navigable river where it is liable to be
washed into such water by tides, storms, floods, or otherwise. United States v. Ballard
Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cit. 1952); La Merced, 84 F.2d 444 (9th Cit. 1936). See
United States v. Federated Homes, Inc., 68 Crim. 574 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1969); United
States v. Corp. of the Era, 68 Crim. 903 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1969). See also 1 N.R.D.C.
Newsletter i-iii (1971).
9 One important source has stated this proposition as follows:
The usefulness of the Refuse Act [Rivers and Harbors Act] has been substantially increased by liberal judicial interpretation over the years together with
the passage of many statutes and the issuance of Executive orders designed to
minimize pollution, maximize recreation, protect esthetics, and preserve natural
resources to enhance the public interest rather than private gain. It is apparent
that the Refuse Act is a broad charter of authority and a powerful legal tool
for preventing the pollution of all navigable waters. STAFF OF HOUSE CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMM., 91ST. CONG., 2D SESS.,
Qui Tam AcTIONS AND THE 1899 REFUSE AcT: CITIZEN LAWSUITS
AGAINST POLLUTERS OF THE NATION'S WATERWAYS 10 (Comm. Print.
1970) (footnotes omitted).
See generally Hearings on the Refuse Act Permit Program Before the Subcomm. on the
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 7, at 1-219
(1971).
10 E.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 406,411 (1964).
11 See Guidelines for Litigation Under the Refuse Act, reprinted in 1 BNA ENVIRON.
REP., Current Devs. 288-90 (1970). The stated policy of the guidelines was:
[T]o ... encourage United States Attorneys to use the Refuse Act to punish or
prevent significant discharges, which are either accidental or infrequent, but
which are not of a continuing nature resultingfrom the ordinary operationsof a
manufacturingplant. Discharges of this last type, of course, pose the greatest
threat to the environment - but it is precisely this type of discharge that the
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ernment's negative attitude towards the Act, have searched for
methods to utilize its dormant, but potentially powerful enforcement
provisions. One answer has been the revival of citizens' qui tam
lawsuits. The qui tam action, with roots extending back many centuries, is a civil action brought by a private informer under a penal
statute to collect part of the pecuniary fine provided therein. The
qui tam action was born of the necessity to prosecute minor, but
hard-to-detect violations at a time when professional law enforcement was at a primitive level. Today, the qui tam mode of procedure still constitutes an effective and inexpensive method of prosecuting those who violate penal statutes. Perhaps even more important,
qui tam actions fill the void left when the executive chooses to enforce the laws of the land in a lackadaisical fashion. The qui tam
plaintiff, not subject to the demands of multi-million dollar lobbies
and other pressure groups, is provided with an incentive to sue every
Congress created the Federal Water Quality Administration to decrease or eliminate, and it is to the programs, policies, and procedures of that Agency that we
shall defer with respect to the bringing of actions under the Refuse Act. Id.
at 288 (emphasis added).
Even though section 17 of the Rivers and Harbors Act directs United States attorneys
to "vigorously prosecute," these Guidelines allow public attorneys to initiate civil or
criminal action without authorization from the Department of Justice only where the
alleged violator was not: (1) a state or municipality, or a person authorized by a state
or municipality; or (2) a person or firm whose discharges were the subject of any nonfederal government litigation (e.g., litigation by a state, county, municipality, etc.). Id.
at 289.
The reaction to these Guidelines was almost universally adverse, since they obviously
eliminate many important categories of corporate polluters from the ambit of the Act.
See, e.g., Correspondence Between the Conservation Foundation and the Department
of Justice on Enforcement of the Refuse Act, reprinted in 1 BNA ENVIRON. REP., Current Devs. 432 (1970). Some notable conservationists have documented a rather intriguing correlation between lax enforcement of the Act against large corporate polluters and
contributions to the Republican Party. See Cleveland Press, Feb. 12, 1971, § G, at 8,
col. 1.
The next major step taken by the Department of Justice to "darify lines of authority" under the Act was the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretary of the
Interior and the Secretary of the Army, 33 C.F.R § 209.120(d) (11) (Comp. 1971),
and the Draft Guidelines for Litigation Under the Refuse Act Permit Program, reprinted
in 1 BNA ENVIRON. REP., Current Devs. 1099 (1971), issued pursuant thereto. The
net result of these later statements was to remove what vestige of authority the earlier
guidelines had granted. See Note, The Refuse Act: Its Role Within the Scheme of
Federal Water Quality Legislation, 46 N.Y.U.L REv. 306, 337-42 (1971). The latest
and most complete betrayal of the legislative mandate expressed in the Rivers and Harbors Act is the so-called Refuse Act Permit Program. Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R.
188 (1970 Comp.). See generally Hearings on the Refuse Act Permit Program Before
the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 82d Cong. 1st
Sess., ser. 7, Passim (1971); 1 BNA ENVIRON. REP., Current Devs. 1097 (1971); Answers of the Environmental Protection Agency Regarding the Refuse Act Permit Program, reprinted in 1 BNA ENVIRON. REP., Current. Devs. 1123-25 (1971); Note, The
Refuse Act: Its Role Within the Scheme of Federal Water Quality Legislation, 46
N.Y.U.L. REV. 306, 329-31 (1971).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:173

violator of a penal statute because be will receive a moiety of any
fine or penalty imposed.
In order for a qui tam action to lie, there must be: (1) a penal
statute which provides a pecuniary penalty; (2) a provision within
the statutue that a part of the penalty shall go to the informer; and
(3) some evidence of a legislative intent that the informer may sue
to recover his share of the penalty."2 Section 16 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act contains enforcement provisions which have been the
impetus for qui tam actions. This section reads:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall
knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provisions of [sections 13, 14 and 151 of this title shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding $2,500 nor less than $500, or by imprisonment (in

the case of a natural person) for not less than thirty days nor more
than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, one-half of said fine to be paid to the person or
persons giving information which shall lead to conviction.' 8
It is the last part of section 16, the clause giving the moiety to the
informer, which has been the focus of the qui tam proponents.
Section 16 is one of several enforcement provisions in the Act, but
it is the only one with a clause even mentioning an informer. The
critical question in deciding whether qui tam actions are authorized
under the Act is the legislative intent surrounding this informer provision.
In no case under the Rivers and Harbors Act has a qui tam ac'2 See, e.g., Williams v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910);
Miami Copper Co. v. State, 17 Ariz. 179, 149 P. 758 (1915). Another formulation
defines the qui tam action as:
An action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same
shall be recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any person who
will bring such action and the remainder to the state or some other institution
... because the plaintiff states that he sues as well for the state as for himself.
BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1414 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
See also 3 W. BLACKsToNE, CommENTARIES* 160; 2 L. RADzI owIcz, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAw 138 (1957).
A common informer is defined as:
[A] person who habitually ferrets out crimes and offenses and lays information
thereof before the ministers of justice, in order to set a prosecution on foot,
not because of his office or any special duty in the matter, but for the sake of the
share of the fine or penalty which the law allots to the informer in certain cases.
BLACK'S LAW DICTINARY 919 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
One court that extolled the virtues of informers' actions stated: "prosecutions conducted
[by private persons acting under the stimulus of greed] compare with the ordinary
methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slowgoing public vessel." United
States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Ore. 1885), aff'd 30 F. 762 (D. Ore. 1887).
i 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
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tion yet been allowed. But the reluctance to permit these citizen
suits seems to stem primarily from a failure to understand -the history
and the l6gal theory of actions qui tam. The primary objective of
this Note is to evaluate the Riveis and ,Harbors Act in light of qul
tam theory. But first, to avoid the difficulties "which have beetn.occurring in the courts, an historical and legal survey of qui tam .actions
will be made. Finally, fter completing the interpretation of the relevant portions of the Act, several of the decisions which haie'deried
qui tamd acti6ns wiU be examined.
II.

THE HIsTokY AND LEGAL THEORY'

OF Qui Tam ACTiONS
An analysis of the recent decisions which have dismissed informer
actions filed under section 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, reveals
that today's courts have a poor understanding of both penal statutes
and qui tam actions.' 4 No recent case faced with the issue has provided either a logical framework for deciding the qui tam question or
persuasive support for its conclusions. Only one of about a dozen
decisions has even attempted to grapple with legislative intent' 5 and
none of the courts have adequately confronted the many. cogent
arguments favorable to the qui tam action. In order to reverse this
cursory treatment of the issue, it is best to begin by discussing the
basic theory and rules applicable to any qui tam action, and then
to look at the Rivers and Harbors Act specifically., The history of the
action not only reveals the reasons for its growth and acceptance in
England and then in America, but also elucidates the purpose of
the qui tam mode of recovery. With this background, it will be
possible to make a comprehensive assessment of the qui tam question
under the mandate of section 16 that the informer receive one-half
of any fine imposed.1
14 See Gerbing v. ITr Rayonier, Inc.,
F. Supp.
[2 ERC 1801] (M.D. Fla.
1971); Connecticut Action Now v. Robert Plating Co., ___ F. Supp.
[2 ERC 1731]
(D. Conn. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y. v. Scholze Tannery, 329 F. Supp.
339 (F.D. Tenn. 1971); Enquist v. Quaker Oats, 327 F. Supp. 347 (D. Neb. 1971);
United States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest'Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn.
1971); United States v. Florida-Vanderbilt Dev. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla.
1971); Durning v. ITT Rayoier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Bass
Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y. v. United States Steel Corp.; 324 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.
Ala.), aff'd --- F. 2d _ [3 ERC 1065] (5th Cir. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's
Soc'y. v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex.
1971); Reuss v. Moss-Am., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wisc. 1971).
15
United States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D..Minn.

1971).
16 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).

Several courts have held that an informer can recover a
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The English and American Histories of Qui Tam Actions

Since its earliest appearance the qui tam1 7 action has maintained
a close, symbiotic relationship with the criminal branch of AngloSaxon law. 8 This relationship originated primarily with two factors, both of which also played an important role in the creation of
the qui tam action. First, only a rudimentary and inadequate prosecutorial administration existed before the appearance of professional
police forces. To discover and prosecute criminal or statutory offenses, Parliament often found it a "common expedient to give the
public-at-large an interest in seeing that a statute was enforced by
giving to any member of the public the right to sue for the penalty
imposed for its breach, and allowing him to get some part of that
penalty."'"
The second factor contributing to the creation of the
action qui tam was Parliament's lack of confidence in the Crown's
propensity to enforce the law expressed by certain statutes. During
"an age when the authorities could be suspected of refusing, out of
favouritism or fear to prosecute a particular kind of person, it [was
believed very wise to have the] machinery of the common informer
20
to secure that in proper cases a man would be brought to book.
The rationale of the qui tam action in reckoning with these
problems was quite simple:
Under [qui tam] statutes, financial incentives were provided, the
purpose of which was to create and keep active a vast number of
"voluntary policemen," who were to be paid on the results achieved
by their own zeal and enterprise. They were not enlisted into
regular service .... Yet it was hoped that they would be of great
assistance in the administration of criminal21justice, solely because of
the spur provided by the offer of reward.
moiety of the penalty for information that was supplied leading to conviction, although
the point is not settled. Compare United States v. Transit-Mix Concrete Corp., --- F.
Supp....
[2 ERC 1074] (S.D.N.Y. 1970) with Shipman v. United States, 309 F. Supp.
441 (E.D. Va. 1970).
17 The phrase was "qui tam pro domino rege, etc. quam pro se ipso in haa parte
sequitur," 3 W. BLACKSTONE,* supra note 12, at 160, which translated literally reads
"who sues as well for the King as for himself."
18
See generally Annot., 53 L. Ed. 739 (1909); W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw (1924); J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
(1883); J. STEPHEN, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1928) (G.
Cheshire, ed.); L. RADZINOWIcZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAw (1957).
19 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 355 (1924).
20 171 PARL DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1052 (1951)
(Viscount Simon speaking in
the House of Lords during debate on the Common Informers Bill).
"The Government were thought to be less keen on enforcing [various penal statutes)
than Parliament wished them to be." 483 PARL. DEB., H.C (5th ser.) 2092 (1951).
21 2 L. RADZNOWICZ, supra note 12, at 145-46.
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The moiety to the informer was clearly intended as a reward, but it
was intended as well to reimburse the informer for the expenses of
detecting and prosecuting the action.2 2 The moiety came not from
the government for information, but from the successful prosecution
of a qui tam action. While the detection of serious crimes was stimulated by rewards, the common informer was stimulated merely by
23
his share in the penalty.
From the outset, the qui tam action was viewed as an excellent
mode for enforcing criminal laws and it quiddy grew in acceptance
and scope. "Much reliance [became) placed upon common informers to secure the enforcement of laws affecting public order and
safety." 2 -Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, many statutes
authorizing qui tam actions were passed, so widening the activities
of the common informer "that an important section of the criminal
law- came to depend upon them for its enforcement."2 5 Qui tam
statutes were especially popular in dealing with non-indictable 'offtnses or misdemeanors, particularly those involving trade or commerce violations. 6 Many leading and influential figures of the time
approved' of the informer's action, and hope was expressed "to extend [its) usefulness and vigilance to all the lesser infringements of
27
the law."
Even after police enforcement techniques reached a level of relative sophistication and professional police forces were more adequately manned, the common informer remained thoroughly entrenched as an adjunct of criminal justice.28 Because the qui tam
action was so valuable in ferreting out and prosecuting minor, but
hard-to-detect offenses, the number of qui tam statutes expanded constantly.
22

See Southern Express Co. v. Virginia ex rel. Walker, 92 Va. 59 (1895).
Professor Radzinowicz writes, after discussing the different types of rewards that were
available for crime detection, that the qui tam action was used primarily for lesser infringements of the law since "[t]housands of these were committed everyday, and although most of them were non-indictable offenses or misdemeanors, they had nevertheless
considerable social significance." 2 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 12, at 146. Thus, the
moiety of the appointed penalty was clearly designed as an incentive for prosecution, not

merely for detection.
2

3 The detection of the more serious crimes was stimulated by rewards, pardons, or
Tyburn tickets. See 2 L. RADZINOWicZ, supra note 12, at 33-138, 155-61.
24 Id. at 143.
25 Id.at 142.
26 4 W. HoLDsWORTH, supra note 18, at 355; 2 L RADzlNowIcz, supra note 12,
at 146-47.
27 2 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 12, at 142.
28Id. at 155.
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The incentive of the "moiety of the appointed penalty" was not confined to a few isolated penal statutes selected at random. It formed
part of the deliberate and consistent policy of the legislature and
pervaded the entire body of the criminal law. It acquired the character of a regular system in process of continual expansion. The result was a social situation in which the common -informer was expected to act as a policeman, and 2as9 a protector of the community
against a vast mass of delinquency.
Despite this expansion of the qui tam mode. of action, English
opinion eventually became critical and all qui tam statutes were repealed in 1951.30 The compelling reason for their repeal, however,

was not a dissatisfaction with the qui tam action per se. The difficulty was actually with the kinds of substantive laws that had been
made enforceable by qui tam actions.

At one point, common in-

formers were allowed to sue villages that tolerated vagrants. The
informers received the traditional part of the penalties imposed on
the villages, and they were also given the convicted pauper for a
period of two years to do with as they pleased."' For the most part,
the problem with the English qui tam was the absurd ways in which
32
the action was used, rather than a defect in the action itself.
29 Id. at 146-47.
A schedule of statutes
SDCommon Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 39 (1951).
which were repealed by the enactment of the Common Informers Act is attached thereto.
31 Vagabond's Act, 1 Edw. 6, c. 3 (1547). See 2 L. RADZINOWIcZ, supra note 12, at
139-40 and authorities cited therein.
32 The effectiveness of the qui tam mode of procedure is evidenced by the widespread
dislike for it amongst those who violated penal statutes. No doubt, the abandonment of
qui tam enforcement in England was partially a result of the actions of certain informers,
as well as the kind of substantive law provisions involved. The utilization of avarice as a
motivation for prosecuting statutory violations, coupled with the large number of trivial
statutes which authorized penal actions led to the creation of professional informers.
[T here arose a small but ruthless and unprincipled group of people who, from
time to time, interested themselves in particular sets of statutes the enforcement
of which would provide them with easy and appreciable profit. Some Acts,
indeed, came to be known as "theirs." These were the Acts under which they
could reap a remarkably abundant harvest, either from the penalties appointed
by the legislature or by means of their own technique of blackmail and extortion. 2 L. RADzNowicz, supra note 12, at 147.
Sir Edward Coke, who referred to informers as "that viperous vermin" described their activities thusly: "The vexatious informer who, under the reverend mantle of law and justice, instituted for the protection of the innocent and the good of the commonwealth,
doth vex and pauperise the subject and community of the poorer sort, for malice of private ends and never for love of justice." See 171 PARL. DEB., H.L (5th ser.) 1053-54
(1951).
In fact, however, the only abuse which could be traced directly to the nature of qui
tam actions was a technique known as "compounding." An offender subject to liability
under a penal statute would simply oblige a friend to institute prosecution as an informer, and then either settle or dismiss the action. Since qui tam actions are normally
alternate remedies to criminal prosecution, the institution of either method of recovery
barred the other. The result of compounding was to bar a later bona fide prosecution.
See 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 357-58. This practice was declared illegal in
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Largely because of a more judicious use of qui tam statutes, the
American legal attitude towards this mechanism of enforcement has
remained positive3 3 Only a few anomalous cases - including some
recent decisions on the Rivers and Harbors Act - have expressed a
somewhat hostile attitude. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess34 illustrates the typical liberal American reception of qui tam suits. In
reversing a court of. appeals, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
the lower court's restrictive and unfavorable'approach to qui tam
statutes. The defendant had argued that qui tam actions were alien
to American jurisprudence and, in any event, were unavailable where
the only important information provided by the informer was copied
verbatim from a Government indictment. 35 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit agreed, holding that an action would not lie
in favor of the plaintiff. The lower court suggested that qui tam ac
tions had "always been regarded-with disfavor" by the courts and so
were to be construed "with utmost strictness."'
The Supreme Court
disagreed with this notion in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black: "We
cannot accept either the interpretativeapproach or the actualdecision
of the court below. Qui tam suits have frequently been permitted
by legislative action and have not been without defense by the
courts."'3 1 Justice Black then cited several illustrative cases and
statutes. 39 In particular he noted language in Marvin v. Trout4
England by 18-Eliz., c. 6 (1562) and made perpetual by 27 Eliz., c. 10 (1585). These
two statutes, followed by 34 Eliz., c. 5 (1593), were aimed at restricting unscrupulous ac-

tivities by informers, mainly by interjecting refinements and technicalities into the procedures surrounding qui tam actions. See 4 W. BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES* 136; 2
L RADz_ owIcz, supra note 12, at 138-39. In America, the same result was achieved by
merely restricting an informer's right to discontinue a qui tam action without the approval of the proper public prosecuting official. See, e.g., United States v. Griswold, 24
F. 361 (D. Ore. 1885), aff'd 30 F. 762 (D.Ore. 1887); Burley v. Burley, 6 N.H. 200
(1833). After curing that evil, the only remaining problem with informers' actions in
England were the statutes which Parliament allowed them to enforce.
33Not only is there no significant evidence of any kind of abuse, but recent years
have seen the introduction of many statutes to expand the citizens' role in protecting the
environment. See notes 204-05 infra.
34 317 U.S. 537; see also the companion case United States ex rel. Ostrager v. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 317 U.S. 562 (1943).
3
5Itwas this precise point, that information copied from public sources was enough
to sustain a successful qui tam conviction, which was legislatively overruled by the enactment of 31 U.S.C. § 232 (E)(1) (1964). See United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. Brooks,
110 F. Supp. 175 (1953), aff'd 210 F.2d 257 (1954).
36 127 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1942).
37 Id. at 235.
317 U.S.'at 541 (emphasis added).
39 Among federal statutes authorizing a qui tam action by an informer are the following: Act of February 26, 1885, § 3, 23 Stat. 332, 333 (importation of alien labor); Act of
July 8, 1870, § 39, 16 Stat. 198, 203 (later 35 U.S.C. § 50, since repealed) (falsely mark38
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where the Supreme Court had commented on qui tam actions:
"Statutes for actions by a common informer, who himself has no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute,
have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this
country ever since the foundation of our Government." Throughout, the Marcus opinion recognizes this historical importance and
evinces a very receptive attitude towards qui tam actions.
Sutton v. Phillips,4 decided in 1895, is indicative of the legal
community's view towards qui tam actions at the time the Rivers
and Harbors Act was passed. Sutton was a suit by an informer to
recover his moiety of the penalty under a penal statute. The defendant contended that informer statutes were disfavored by the
courts and that statutes awarding a part of the penalty to informers
were easily repealed by implication by subsequent legislative enactments. The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected this restrictive philosophy and extolled the merits of the qui tam action.
From time immemorial in the English law, it has been found that
qui tam actions .. . were an efficient, and indeed, sometimes an indispensable means of enforcing the law in many cases .. . and Parliament in England and legislative bodies in this country have42freely
enacted statutes for the enforcement of laws by such actions.

The court went on to say that there had been no agitation for the
repeal of such statutes 45 and that virtually every North Carolina
Legislature had enacted informer statutes.4 4 The court concluded
that it would be a radical departure to follow a restrictive course of
construction and declare these acts impliedly repealed by other legislation.
ing articles as patented); Act of March 2, 1863, § 4, 12 Star. 696, 698 (codified in 31 U.
S.C. §§ 231-33) (defrauding the Government); Act of Aug. 5, 1861, § 11, 12 Star. 292,
296 (collectors of revenue); Act of August 30, 1852, § 41, 10 Stat. 61, 75 (regulation of
steamboats); Act of March 22, 1794, §§ 2, 4, 1 Stat. 347, 349 (codified in 46 U.S.C. §§
1351-56 (slave traders); Act of March 3, 1791, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209 (collection of duties on liquor). See also STAFF OF HOUSE CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES
SUBcOMM., 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., Qvi Tam ACTIONS AND THE 1899 REFUSE ACT:
CITIZEN LAWSUITS AGAINST POLLUTERS OF THE NATION'S WATERWAYS 3-4 (Comm.
Print 1970).
40 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905).
41 116 N.C. 502, 21 S.E. 968 (1895).
421d. at 507, 21 S.E. at 969 (emphasis added).
43 d. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); notes 204-05
infra.
44 "Scarcely a single Legislature since the Convention of 1875 [at which the Constitution of the State of North Carolina was adopted], has passed, which did not recognize
the power and duty of the Legislature in this particular by enacting or amending statutes
conferring the whole or a part of penalties upon persons suing for the same." Sutton v.
Phillips, 116 N.C. 502, 506, 21 S.E. 968, 969 (1895).
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Other decisions contemporaneous with the passage of the Rivers
and Harbors Act expounded a similar philosophy. For example,
Southern Express Co. v. Virginia ex rel. Walker4" involved an informer's action that was met by a challenge like that raised by the
defendant in Sutton. The Walker opinion upheld the penal statute
involved and spoke favorably of the wisdom of informer actions.
The court emphasized the value of the qui tam action in promoting
law enforcement and noted the longevity of its role in American
law: "[Ilt has been the practice of the legislature, for a hundred
years or more ...to provide, with the view of stimulating prosecutions in such cases, that an informer should be entitled to a part of
40
[a] forfeiture or fine."1
Thus, the American experience with qui tam actions allows several conclusions to be drawn. First, civil actions by qui tam plaintiffs
have been recognized as necessary and expeditious adjuncts of criminal law enforcement, as they were in early England. Second, the
qui tam mode of enforcement has been used most commonly to prosecute minor but hard-to-detect statutory offenses, which have often
involved trade or commerce. Also, the payment to the informer is
intended as compensation for the costs of prosecution, as well as a
reward for his vigilance. But unlike the recent English hostility towards qui tam actions, the American attitude is still one of liberal
acceptance and receptiveness.
B. The Legal Rationale of the Qui Tam ActionA Civil Action to Collect a Debt
Although the action qui tam is closely related to the criminal law,
and although the action is a statutory proceeding grounded on a
penal statute, it is a civil action both in form and substance.4 7 A
firm appreciation for its civil nature is essential to understand the
legal status of the qui tam action, particularly when considering the
Rivers and Harbors Act. The right of action is always statutory in
origin - it is a mode of procedure which in some way must be
granted by the legislature. But the remedy pursued - once the
4592 Va. 59, 22 S.E. 809 (1895).
46 Id. at 63, 22 S.E. at 810.
47

See, e.g., Miami Copper Co. v. State, 17 Ariz. 179, 149 P. 758 (1915). The action
is civil regardless of whether the offense is labeled a crime. "[IThere is no distinction
better known than the distinction between civil and criminal law, or between criminal
prosecutions and civil actions. Mr. Justice Blackstone and all the modern writers upon
the subject distinguish between them. Penal actions were never yet put under the head
of criminal law, or crimes." Adams, qui tam v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 336, 338
(1805) (quotation from Solicitor General's brief).
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right of action is established by statute - is the common law remedy of an action in the nature of a debt. This common law remedy is used to recover the penalties provided under certain penal
statutes.48
The debt is grounded upon the following rationale. Where an
act prescribes a forfeiture of a sum of money, or a fine or penalty, an
action of debt lies because the statute creates a direct debt and a
consequent duty.49 The theory for the recovery of the debt is on a
contract implied in law. The action is founded upon that implied
contract which every person enters into with the state to obey the
laws.8 In other words, the recovery of the debt is dependent only
upon the existence of an implied contract, between individual and
state, that is effected by a penal statute.8 ' One authority explains
this relationship by emphasizing the implied, rather than express nature of the contract:
48 See 3 W. BLACKSTONE,* sapra note 12, at 158-61.
49 Id.
50
The following passage written by Blackstone elucidates the logic behind this premise:
From these express contracts the transition is easy to those that are only
implied by law, which are such as reason and justice dictate, and which therefore the law presumes that every man has contracted to perform; and upon this
presumption makes him answerable to such persons as suffer by his nonperformance.
Of this nature are, first, such as are necessarily implied by the fundamental
constitution of government, to which every man is a contracting party. And
thus it is that every person is bound and hath virtually agreed to pay such particular sums of money as are charged on him by the sentence, or assessed by the
interpretation of the law. For it is a part of the original contract, entered
into by all mankind who partake the benefits of society, to submit in all points
to the municipal constitutions and local ordinances of that state, of which each
individual is a member. Whatever therefore the laws order any one to pay,
that becomes instantly a debt, which he bath before-hand contracted to discharge...
The same reason may with equal justice be applied to all penal statutes,
that is, such acts of Parliament whereby a forfeiture is inflicted for transgressing the provisions therein enacted. The party offending is here bound by the
fundamental contract of society to obey the directions of the Legislature, and
pay the forfeiture incurred to such persons as the law requires. The usual application of this forfeiture is either to the party aggrieved, or else to any of the
king's subjects in general ...
But more usually these forfeitures created by statute are given at large to
any common informer; or, in other words, to any such person or persons as will
sue for the same: and hence such actions are called popular actions, because
they are given to the people in general. Sometimes one part is given to the
king, to the poor, or to some public use, and the other part to the informer or
prosecutor: and then the suit is called a qui tam action, because it is brought
by a person qui tam pro domino rege, etc., quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur (who prosecutes this suit as well for the king, etc., as for himself). 3 W.
BLACKSTONE,* supra note 12, at 158-60 (footnotes omitted).
51 See, e.g., Stearns v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 1188 (No. 13,341) (D. Vt. 1835).
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[T]here are some things in action which cannot properly be said to
have [an expressly contractual] origin, and the withholding of
which will nevertheless constitute a wrong or injury, viz. such debts
as result from the obligation to .pay money pursuant to . . . an enactment of the legislature . . . of that class called penal statutes,
[wherein] a pecuniary forfeiture is inflicted for committing some
specified offense, and such forfeiture is made recoverable,
by the
crown, or the party aggrieved, or by a common informer ... . This
obligation or liability to pay a specific sum of money constitutes...
a debt, so that the party . . . who transgresses the penal statute is
immediately owing to the crown, the party aggrieved, or the common informer, as the case may be, the amount of the penalty. The
remedy for the recovery of such debt.., is by action of debt ...
on the penal statute [and] this remedy is generally designated as a
penal action, or, where one part of the forfeiture is given to the
crown, and the other part to the informer, a ... qui tam action.5 2
In summary, the law presumes that every man impliedly contracts
with the government to obey and discharge all liabilities reasonably
imposed by penal statutes. Where a penal statute demands a penalty for its violation, that penalty instantly becomes a debt owed by
the violator which may be sued for and collected by any properly
designated person.
A penal statute, under which such a debt can arise, is a statute
which prohibits an act and imposes a penalty for the commission of
it. The statute imposes a fine, penalty, or forfeiture for the commission of an offense against the public or a wrong committed
5
against the stateY
3
The purposes of the statute are to punish the
wrongdoer, to deter future violations, and to indemnify the public
for the ills caused by the transgression.5
Of all the areas of confusion surrounding qui tam actions - particularly in decisions under the Rivers and Harbors Act55 - none is more important or perplexing as that caused by the definition of a penal statute.5 6 Never523 H. STEPHENs, NEW CoMMENTARiEs ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 535-36
(1928).
5
3 See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1290 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
54 See generally Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915); Brady v.
Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Atlanta v.
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 F. 23 (6th Cir. 1903); State v. Chicago, Mil. &

St. P. Ry. Co., 122 Iowa 22, 96 N.W. 904 (1903) and authorities cited therein; Commonwealth v. Am. Express Co., 167 Ky. 685, 181 S.W. 353 (1916); McNeely v. Natchez,
148 Miss. 268, 114 S. 484 (1927); Matter v. Repp, 80 N.J. 530, 77 A. 1030 (1910);
Silberman v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 11 N.J. Misc. 907, 169 A. 170 (C.P. Union County
1933); Smith Engineering Works v. Custer, 194 Okla. 318, 151 P.2d 404 (1944) and
authorities cited therein; Gawthrop v. Fairmount Coal Co., 74 W. Va. 39, 81 S.E. 560

(1914).
55 See the recent decisions cited in note 14 supra.

50
Much of the earlier confusion involving qui tam actions was caused by a subtle definitional change. In England, penal actions were separate and distinct from popular or
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theless, if one relies on the basic definitions, there should be little
confusion in actual application.
Over 75 years ago, the Supreme Court was called upon to resolve
the problem of defining a penal statute and it relied on Blackstone's
universally accepted classification to express a simple and workable
rule: "The test whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary
sense, is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the
public, or a wrong to the individual .... ."" If the wrong is to the
public, then the law is penal; if the wrong is to an individual, then
the law is remedial.5 8
The penalty [provided by a penal statute] is not imposed or given
as a redress for mere private wrong[s] to property, but in furtherance of a broad public policy within the police powers of the State
[to punish wrongdoers and deter others]. Action for the penalty
is not meant for the vindication of private rights ....

Nor does it

preclude separate action for that. The penalty does not accrue to
one out of his property, but out of the vindication of the public
weal. It is not given as damages in relation to the former, but as
punishment in relation to the latter. 59
Because the term "penal" is much broader, in its generic sense,
than "criminal," the act proscribed by a penal statute may or may
not be a crime. 60 The actions available to recover the sum provided
in the statute may be either a criminal action, a penal action, or
qui tam actions. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1289 (4th ed, rev. 1968), in discussing
this change, notes that originally "[a] penal action or information [was) brought by an
officer, and the penalty [went] to the king. 1 Chit. Gen. Pr. 25, note; 2 Archb. Pr. 188.
But in American law, the term includes actions brought by informers or other private
persons, as well as those instituted by governments or public officers." See also 4 W.
BLACKSTONE,* supra note 12, at 308-09.
57
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892).
58 Id. If the wrong done is to the individual, the statute which grants a private right
of action is remedial rather than penal notwithstanding the designation of the sum to be
recovered as a "penalty." Id.; Diversey v. Smith, 103 Ill. 378 (1882). "Where a statute is both penal and remedial, as where it is penal in one part and remedial in the other,
it should be considered as a 'penal statute' when it is sought to enforce the penalty, and as
a 'remedial statute' when it is sought to enforce the remedy." Collins v. Kidd, 38 F.
Supp. 634, 637 (D.C. Tex. 1941).
59 Gawthrop v. Fairmont Coal Co., 74 W. Va. 39, 81 S.E. 560, 561 (1914). See also
Iowa v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. Co., 122 Iowa 22, 26, 96 N.W. 904, 905 (1903)
where the court stated:
The purpose of the [penal] action is not the punishment of the defendant in
the sense legitimately applicable to the term, but such action is brought to recover the penalty as a fixed sum by way of indemnity to the public for the injury suffered by reason of the violation of the statute. The effect is merely to
charge the defendant with pecuniary liability, while a criminal prosecution is
had for the purpose of punishment of the accused.
60 See, e.g., Matter v. Repp, 80 N.J. 530, 77 A. 1030 (1910); BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1289 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
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both.61 A penal action is one founded solely upon a penal statute.
The only object of a penal action is the recovery of a fine, penalty,
or forfeiture, imposed as a punishment for the commission of the
proscribed offense. It is not intended to indemnify the person injured by the violation nor to correlate the amount of the penalty
to the actual damages caused.62 In some jurisdictions, the character
of a penal action as to whether it is civil or criminal is determined
by the form of proceeding which is adopted,6 while in other jurisdictions, the proceeding is regarded as quasi-criminal.! In any
event, a penal action does not necessarily have to be a criminal prosecution, notwithstanding that it is a suit to punish an offense against
the public.6 5
Once it is decided that a statute is penal, rather than remedial,
the only question remaining is how the statute may be enforced. If
the proscribed conduct is not a crime, then the statute can be enforced only by a civil action, brought either by the state or on its
behalf. If the offense is designated a crime, then the statute may
be enforceable by either a criminal prosecution,"' a civil action by or
on behalf of the state,6 7 or both.6 8 If the penal statute declares the
offense a felony, or declares the punishment something other than
a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, then the statute can only be enforced
by a criminal prosecution. 9 But if the offense is declared a misdemeanor and if the punishment is a pecuniary sum, it may be recovered by a civil action in the nature of debt, at least in the absence
of a provision in the statute to the contrary. 70 This rule applies
whether or not the sum may also be collected in a proceeding which
is criminal, since the two methods of enforcement are used to com61See 36 AM. J.

2d, Forfeitures and Penalties §§ 1-14 (1968); Annot., 53 L. Ed.

739 (1909).
6

2 See, e.g., Smith Engineering Works v. Custer, 194 Okla. 318, 151 P.2d 404
(1944); Gawthrop v. Fairmount Coal Co., 74 W. Va. 39,81 S.E. 560 (1914) and authorides cited therein.
63 See, e.g., State v. McConnell, 70 N.H. 158, 46 A. 458 (1900).
6
4 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 372 (1873); BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 446
(4th ed. rev. 1968).
65
See, e.g., Stout v. State ex rel. Caldwell, 36 Okla. 744, 130 P. 553 (1913).
66
See, e.g., McNair v. People, 89 El. 441 (1878).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896); Stockwell v. United
States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871).
68
See, e.g., Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); Miami Copper Co. v.
State, 17 Ariz. 179, 149 P. 758 (1915); State ex rel. Kemp v. Hannibal & St. J. Ry. Co.,
30 Mo. App. 494 (1888).
6
9 See, e.g., United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546 (1878).
70
See, e.g., United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914); Stockwell v. United States,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871).
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plement one another.7 ' Because these various methods of enforcement can coexist under one penal statute, the sole inquiry must be
the legislative intent behind the promulgation of the statute. It is
meaningless to perfunctorily hold a statute criminal, and therefore
exclusive of civil qui tam recoveries - as has been done in Rivers
and Harbors decisions72 - since this exclusiveness is not a necessary, or even common, consequence under Anglo-American law.
III.
16

THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND SECTIONS
AND

17

OF THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT

Where a penal statute expressly grants an informer the right to
prosecute, or the right to maintain an action of debt, there is no
question but that a qui tam action will lie. Yet many penal statutes
fail to contain any such express authorization, but do include sufficient evidence of legislative intent to allow the implication of an
informer's right to prosecute.73 Section 16 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act does not contain an express grant of authority to sue, but does
include a clause giving one-half of the recovery to the informer.
In order to decide whether a qui tam action is authorized by section
71 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-34 (1964).
72

See, e.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
78 In United States ex rel. Pressprich & Son Co. v. James W. Elwell & Co., 250 F. 939
(2d Cit. 1918) (opinion by L. Hand, J.), suit was instituted in admiralty to recover a fine
for the alleged violation of section 5 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act which provided:
For a violation of any of the provisions of ... this title the agent, owner, or
master of the vessel guilty of such violation, and who refuses to issue on demand the bill of lading provided for, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding
$2,000.... One-half of such penalty shall go to the party injured by such
violation and the remainder to the Government of the United States. 46
U.S.C. § 194 (1958).
The plaintiff in Pressprich had brought the action in personam. Judge Learned
Hand, speaking for a unanimous court, held that the court below did not have admiralty
jurisdiction in personam, but refused to dismiss the action, stating:
W~e have no doubt that the fine might be collected by a qui tam action in the
District Court . . . and that the jurisdiction of the District Court over the
subject matter was, therefore complete. . . . [O]ur decision in United States
v. Atlantic Fruit Co., [206 F. 440 (2d Cir. 1913)], is to be taken as holding
that the United States has the option in such cases of suing in what would have
been in earlier times an action of debt, despite the unliquidated character of the
recovery. We see no reason to make a distinction between an action by the
United States to collect the fine and an action qui tam like that at bar. 250 F.
at 941.
The Pressprichcourt specifically stated that a qui tam action would lie under a statute not
granting express authority for the informer to sue. The statute in Pressprich, like section
16, refers to a fine. The fact that the moiety was to go to the party injured rather than to
an informer was not determinative, for Judge Hand specifically mentioned that the plaintiff's action for damages still remained.
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16, a court must use some test or guideline to discover whether the
legislature intended this penal statute to be enforced by a civil qui
tam action; the court must decide whether the mention of an informer, the granting to him of half the pecuniary recovery, and a
failure to prohibit him from suing are sufficient evidence of a legislative intent to authorize qui tam actions.
None of the many recent decisions which have confronted the
qui tam issue under section 16 have proffered any standards or guidelines that could be used in arriving at a decision. In fact, only a few
of these courts even mention legislative intent.7 4 Several others have
erroneously concluded that the designation of the recovery as a "fine,"
rather than a "penalty," and similar semantic attributes of section 16
imply that civil actions will not lie.75 Other courts have relied upon
the argument that the section 17 requirement that a criminal'proceeding, if brought, must be ,diligently prosecuted negates any implication that a qui tam action is authorized under section 16.76 In
these instances, the courts have implicitly conceded that section 16
would establish the right to bring an informer action if it were
standing alone, but because it does not stand alone, they have gone
on to hold that section 17 overrides that implication.
Surprisingly, no court has systematically analyzed section 16 with
a view to discovering the legislative intent behind that provision.
Such an analysis is best accomplished through a bifurcated examination of the issue. First a court must decide whether the grant of
authority to launch criminal prosecutions was intended to be the
74

See e.g., United States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87
(D. Minn. 1971). The court discussed the intent of the legislature in enacting the Rivers
and Harbors Act. It dismissed the argument that Congress intended section 16 to allow
qui tam actions by pointing to their abuse and final prohibition in England. Although
the court mentions that the 1899 Congress could not know that five decades later England would prohibit qui tam actions, the court believed that qui tam abuses had been so
notorious that Congress could not have intended to expand its scope of application in this
country. Id. at 91.
The court's arguments are unconvincing. The court does not discuss the many penal statutes that expressly authorize qui tam actions and were passed by Congress after
1899, nor do they consider the many statutes under which qui tam actions have been implied. The court further does not discuss the fact that few instances of abuse occurred in
this country, the factor which primarily contributed to the statute's repeal in England.
75
See, e.g., Connecticut Action Now v. Roberts Plating Co., ___ F. Supp.
[2
E.R.C. 1731) (D. Conn. 1971); Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446
(W.D.
Wash. 1971).
76
See, e.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp.
412 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd --- F.2d --- [3 ERC 1065] (5th Cir. 1971). This decision
stated the proposition that "even where some statutory language seems to grant a private
right of action, if the same or a related statute also clearly places enforcement in the
hands of governmental authorities the right of action is exclusively vested in such governmental authority." Id. at 415. The court then went on to rely on section 17 as such
an explicit vesting of exclusive authority.
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sole method of enforcing a violation of the Act, or merely one of
several alternative modes of procedure. If the court concludes that
criminal prosecution was not intended to be the sole remedy, then it
must decide whether informer actions are a part of the scheme of
remedies intended by Congress.
This section will discuss the guidelines courts have most commonly used to decide whether a qui tam action is impliedly authorized by a statute. But in order to avoid the errors made in the recent
Rivers and Harbors decisions, this section will first discuss certain
semantic aspects of section 16 and the importance of section 17 (and
criminal enforcement generally) to the overall qui tam question under the Act.
A.

Semantic Aspects of Section 16
Some recent decisions under the Rivers and Harbors Act have

77 Alternatively, one could attack the problem by showing, first, that civil actions in
the nature of debt can be brought to recover the penalty prescribed by section 16, and,
second, that a citizen can also bring the action in debt It will be shown below,
notes 136-41 infra & accompanying text, that section 16 allows some type of civil proceedings. But in addition, federal law specifically provides that an action in the nature
of debt should lie under section 16. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (a) (1964). Section 2461 (a)
provides: "Whenever a civil fine, penalty or pecuniary forfeiture is prescribed for the
violation of an act of Congress without specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement
thereof, it may be recovered in a civil action." This provision was added to the Judicial
Code in the 1948 revision, supplemented by the following explanation by the code revisors:
Subsection (a) was drafted to clarify a serious ambiguity in existing law
and is based upon rulings of the Supreme Court. Numerous sections in the
United States Code prescribe civil fines, penalties, and pecuniary forfeitures for
violation of certain sections without specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof....
A civil fine, penalty, or pecuniary forfeiture is recoverable in a civil action.
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess et a., 317 U.S. 537, . . . Hepner v.
United States, 213 U.S. 103, . . . and cases cited therein. Reviser's Note to
28 U.S.C.A. § 2461 (1964).
The Congress of the United States thus feels that where a statute fails to expressly specify a mode for recovering a penalty, a civil action will lie in the nature of debt in favor of
the Government. This contention is historically sound and is in fact, merely a codification of earlier law. This was the precise holding of Adams, qui tam v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 336, 341 (1805), which stated: "In this particular case, the statute which creates
the forfeiture does not prescribe the mode of demanding it; consequently, either debt or
information would lie." And the Rivers and Harbors Act presents such a case, for no
exclusive mode of procedure is prescribed to recover the penalty in section 16. See notes
142-82 infra & accompanying text.
Because the informer has the right to one-half of the penalty in section 16, one can
then argue that the citizen as well as the government can bring the action in debt. "It
cannot be that whether an action of debt is maintainable or not depends on who is the
plaintiff." Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 106 (1909); accord Stockwell v.
United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 542 (1871). Where an action of debt lies, i£e.,
whenever a statute declares a pecuniary penalty, that penalty may be recovered in an
action of debt by either the United States or a private informer unless specifically prohibited by the language of the statute. See 213 U.S. at 106-07.
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pointed to the terminology of section 16 as the primary justification
for denying qui tam actions.78 They have reasoned that certain
words in this section are incompatible with a legislative intent to allow common informers to bring suit. But a close analysis will show
that this result is not justifiable and that a technical interpretation
of a few isolated terms in section 16 cannot be dispositive of the legislative intent question.
In section 16, the punishment is labeled a "fine," as opposed to a
"penalty" or "forfeiture." The cases attributing importance to the
use of the word "fine" have concluded that its use implies that Congress intended that criminal prosecution alone should be used to
enforce the Act, because "fine" presumably has a more punitive and
criminal connotation. Had "penalty" been used, then the statute
would apparently have appeared more civil. But this reasoning is
specious and the fact that the punishment is labeled a "fine" weighs
as much in favor of recovery by a qui tam action as it does in favor
of exclusively criminal proceedings. The purpose of a qui tam action under a penal statute is to apprehend and prosecute those who
have harmed the public by violating legislative enactments; the purpose of criminal statutes is similarly to punish the wrongdoer. 79 Because these purposes are the same, there is no basis for concluding
that the use of "fine" implies a legislative intent to permit criminal
proceedings to the exclusion of qui tam actions. The courts that
have so concluded, however, give no more cogent a reason than this
punitive connotation of "fine." Indeed, it is no less valid to argue
that the more a statute intimates punishment and the vindication of
public rights, the more likely the legislature intended a qui tam action to lie, for the qui tam action is a perfect vehicle to fulfill those
objectives.
In part, the confusion seems to stem from the term "penalty,"
which is subject to several meanings. It can be read as inclusive of
all kinds of punishment or pecuniary liabilities, but it can also be
read more narrowly, as a civil liability specified for the violation of a
statute, excluding "fines" and even "forfeitures." 80 Quite clearly,
78

See, e.g., Connecticut Action Now v. Roberts Plating Co., Inc., ___ F. Supp....
£2 ERC 1731] (D. Conn. 1971), wherein the court inexplicably states: "Plaintiffs in
the instant case were unable to cite any case which sustained a qui tam action to collect

a criminal fine or penalty. And the court has been unable to find such a case."
F. Supp. at
£-[2 ERC at 1732].
70
See notes 53-71 supra & accompanying text.
SoWilentz v. Hendrickson, (Equity) 133 N.J. 447, 33 A.2d 366 (1943), aff'd
(Equity) 135 N.J. 244, 38 A.2d 199. (1944); see 36 AM. JUR. 2d Forfeiture and Penalties §§ 2-5 (1968); B'ACK's LAw DiCTIONARY 1289 (4th ed. 1968).
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the use of one particular term where another might have been used
cannot be dispositive of legislative intent, where, as here, the word
chosen may have different definitions, at least one of which coincides
with the term not chosen.
In any event, there seems to be no support for the position that
the label affixed to the punishment is determinative of whether a
qui tam action is authorized. The traditional cases construing qui
tam statutes (i.e., nearly all those not associated with the Rivers and
Harbors Act) have not deemed the specific designation of the pecuniary recovery conclusive as to the intended mode of procedure.
For example, in Adams, qui tam v. Woods81 the Court considered
the use of a criminal statute of limitations 82 as a defense in a qui tam
action. In holding the statute of limitations applicable, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "[allmost every fine or forfeiture under a
The
penal statute, may be recovered by an action of debt ......
Adams case is important because the Court allowed the criminal
statute of limitations to govern a penal statute employing the word
"forfeiture" (which is almost exclusively associated with civil recovery 84), rather than "fine." Conversely, then, the use of "fine,"
rather than "penalty," should not be determinative of the mode of
procedure under the Rivers and Harbors Act. But even more important, Chief Justice Marshall used the terms "fine" and "forfei' which can only mean the label
ture" as equivalents to "penalty," 85
assigned to the punishment is irrelevant in determining what modes
of enforcement are authorized.
81 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
82
Act of April 30, 1970, § 32, 1 Stat. 119.
83 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 341.
84 See 36 Am. JUR. 2d Forfeituresand Penalties §§ 1, 3-5 (1968).
85 The Chief Justice is obviously using the terms "fine" and "forfeiture" as synonymous or as equivalent to "penalty" since, if the words were read with their narrow, mutually exclusive connotation, the clause would be inherently contradictory. The Adams
result then is that almost every penalty provided by a penal statute, whether it is labeled
a fine or forfeiture, is recoverable both by a civil action in debt and by a criminal information. See Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 106 (1909); Lees v. United States,
150 U.S. 476, 479 (1893).
This interpretation of Adams is fully consistent with the basic theory behind the
use of qui tam actions. The purpose of the civil qui tam action was to augment criminal
prosecution, not to replace it. The several times when the obverse arguments have been
made, that a penal statute contemplates solely civil recovery and consequently excludes
criminal prosecution, courts have often allowed both remedies, implying the right of
criminal prosecution unless expressly prohibited by the statute. See United States v. Stevenson, 215 U.S. 190 (1909), where the court quotes the applicable rule: "In Lees v.
United States, 150 U.S. 476, 479, the doctrine was laid down that a penalty may be recovered by indictment or information in a criminal action, or by a civil action in the form
of an action for debt." Id. at 198.
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In addition to the "fine"-"penalty" problem, some courts have
pointed to other language in section 16 to hold that criminal proceedings alone were intended to be authorized. 6 The title of the section
begins "Penalty for wrongful deposit of refuse" ' and the remainder
of the section contains the terms "knowingly aid," "guilty," "misdemeanor," "conviction," "punished," "fine," and "imprisonment."
But to hold that this terminology precludes a qui tam action is no
more valid than to predicate the same holding on the use of the
word "fine," for the problem is conceptually identical. Because
the purpose of qui tam actions is punishment and deterrence, it is
natural that such terms be included in a statute that creates a qui tam
action. In particular, because qui tam actions were used to prosecute
certain violations (none more onerous than a misdemeanor) ,88 the
fact that the statute allows the conviction of whoever commits the
specified offense is not at all inconsistent with the theory of qui tam
recovery. Also, the statute mentions imprisonment "in the case of
a natural person," but the civil qui tam plaintiff seeks only a monetary reward and such provisions are merely ignored when the action
is civil.89 And finally, section 16 - unlike any of the other enforcement provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act - contains a provision for the moiety to the informer, thus indicating a legislative
intent that the informer play some significant role in enforcing the
Act.
Thus, a logical analysis of section 16 cannot support the position
that criminal proceedings alone were authorized merely because the
statute has factors indicating that criminal proceedings were one
intended method of enforcement. Non-criminal actions often coexist with criminal proceedings under the same act. Moreover, an
examination of cases construing other statutes with wording similar
to that of section 16 reaffirms the conclusion that civil actions are auSo Most decisions single out the phrases "guilty of a misdemeanor," "on conviction
thereof," and "or by imprisonment" as evidence of criminality. See Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 414 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Bass
Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F.
Supp. 302, 305 (S.D. Tex. 1971). Yet each of these phrases is found in cases allowing
civil actions. See United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914) (misdemeanor); United
States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896) (conviction); Commonwealth v. Am. Express Co.,
167 Ky. 685, 181 S.W. 353 (1916) (imprisonment).
87 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
88 Although an offense is labeled a "misdemeanor," it does not prevent a civil action
in the nature of debt from being an alternative mode of prosecution. United States v.
Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1914).
89
See the authorities cited in note 86 supra.
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thorized under this section. In Stockwell v. United States," for example, the Supreme Court allowed the United States to bring a civil
action to enforce the alleged violation of a statute which read:
[I]f any person or persons shall receive, conceal or buy any goods,
wares, or merchandise, knowing them to have been illegally imported into the United States, and liable to seizure by virtue of any
act in relation to the revenue, such person or persons shall, on conviction thereof, forfeit and pay a sum double the amount or value
of the goods, wares or merchandise, so received, concealed or purchased. 91
This statute was found to support a civil action although clearly
requiring knowledge and a conviction. Likewise, in United States v.
Zucker9" the Supreme Court held that the Government could maintain a civil action under a similar statute which provided, inter alia:
[Ilf any . . . importer . .. shall make . . . any entry of imported
merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice ... such
merchandise or the value thereof, to be recovered from the person
making the entry, shall be forfeited, . . . and such person shall,
upon conviction, be fined for each offense a sum not exceeding five
thousand dollars, or be imprisoned for a time
93 not exceeding two
years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In sum, courts which have accepted the argument that certain
words in section 16 preclude a civil action have ignored equally cogent counterarguments, and they have also ignored a consistent body
of case law which allows civil actions under statutes of similar wording. An accurate analysis of the terminology of section 16 raises no
obstacle to a qui tam action. Stockwell and Zucker stand as a further affirmation of the premise that the intent of Congress cannot be
found by mechanically relying on the use of certain terminology.
B.

The Criminal Mode of Procedure and Section 17

Many of the Rivers and Harbors decisions have concluded that
criminal prosecution is the sole method authorized to enforce section
16. And to support this conclusion, two distinct rationales have been
used in addition to the semantic arguments discussed above. First,
some courts have held that section 16 does not, either by itself or
in conjunction with any other provision of federal law, authorize
civil proceedings. Second, some courts have held that section 17
90 86U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871).
91 Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 58, § 2, 3 Stat. 781.
92 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
93 Customs Administration Act, ch. 407, § 9, 26 Stat. 131, 135 (1890) (repealed 42
Star. 898).
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of the Act (which requires that criminal proceedings by the United
States to enforce the Act must be vigorously prosecuted) overrides
any implication in section 16 that civil actions are permissible.9 4
In this section, these two rationales will be scrutinized and it will
become clear that the courts which have held that criminal proceedings alone are authorized are in error. Their conclusions are contrary to both general legal principles and the decisions under the
Rivers and Harbors Act as well.
The decisions which have adopted the first rationale - that section 16 authorizes only criminal actions - usually begin by concluding that "criminal statutes cannot be enforced by civil actions," and
cite United States v. Jourden95 as support for this proposition. In
Jourden a citizen had brought a civil action under a statute prohibiting the sale of liquor without a license. The statute read:
Anyone engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquor..., who is
required... to have a license, . . . without first having obtained a
license to do so ... , or any person who shall engage in such sale
* , , where the sale thereof is prohibited, upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $2,000 or be imprisoned for not less than one month nor more than one year.96

In dismissing the civil action, the Jourden court stated:
It is the general rule ...

that where a statute provides for the

payment of a license fee as the condition of doing any specified

business, and also provides that a violator of the act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by fine or -imprisonment, the remedy by
prosecution and punishment so prescribed by the statute is exclusive,
unless there is some specialprovision of law which permits the prosecution of a civil action to recover the license fee.97

As noted by the court, the statute involved in Jourden did not contain any civil attribute whatsoever nor did it support any inference
that civil actions were authorized.

The court merely pointed to the

obvious - that where all indications are that the legislature intended
to permit only criminal proceedings, then the only possible conclusion is that criminal prosecution is the sole mode of proceeding. 8
04 See, e.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp.

412, 416 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
95 193 F. 986 (9th Cir. 1912).
96

CAxRvs ANN. CODE CRIM. P., Alaska § 472 (1910).
97 193 F. at 987-88 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
9
8 The court made it quite clear that there was absolutely no civil aspect to the statute:
The present action is not one to recover a tax imposed upon the performance
of an act which all persons are permitted to perform, and which in itself is not
in any way xegulated or restricted, but it is an attempt to recover a fee which
the law prescribed as one of the conditions upon which might be obtained the
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The court specifically stated that there was no "special provision"
indicating authorization for the maintenance of a civil action. 9 Section 16, however, does contain a clause giving a moiety of the pecuniary recovery to the informer. In providing such a distribution of
the penalty, Congress obviously might have contemplated an informer action.' 00 And, at the very least, Congress might have believed that civil actions were appropriate under the Act, whether
brought by individuals or the Government. Moreover, there are other
factors that indicate broader enforcement than criminal prosecution
alone is authorized by the Act'' Thus, the problem in using fourden is that the case only expresses a truism - if a statute is purely
criminal, then civil proceedings will not lie thereunder. But Jourden
does not provide any guidance in deciding whether a penal statute
is purely criminal. To decide whether section 16 authorizes civil
proceedings, and qui tam proceedings in particular, a method of analysis must be used which is not found in Jourden.
Along with Jourden, the Rivers and Harbors decisions have cited
to dictum from United States v. Claflin. °2 Claflin involved an action of debt by the United States under a statute which prohibited
the purchase of illegally imported merchandise.' 3 The statute
provided:
[I]f any person or persons shall receive, conceal, or buy any goods,
wares, or merchandise, knowing them to have been illegally imported
into the United States ... such person or persons shall, on conviction thereof, forfeit and pay a sum double the amount or value of
the goods,
wares, or merchandise so received, concealed, or purchased.' 04
The court discussed this section, which required both knowledge and
a conviction, and conclded that if it had been in force when the
permission to engage in a specified business which is declared by law to be
unlawful without that license. The fee is not a tax imposed upon the business
of selling liquor. . . . Nor do the statutes confer upon the district attorney
the power to legalize an illegal traffic, and to declare that, after the law had
been broken, the lawbreaker shall pay the government the license for doing
that for which no license has been given. 193 F. at 988.
99 Id.
100 In fact, the term "informer" was often included by Parliament in a statute as a
"shorthand" device to indicate authorization for qui tam actions, without completely and
expressly making that authorization clear. 2 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 12, at 147-55.
101 Principal among these is the legislative intent behind the statute. As the Supreme Court has reconstructed this intent, it includes a wide range of implied enforcement mechanisms. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
102 97 U.S. 546 (1878).
103 Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 58, § 2, 3 Stat. 781.
104 Id.
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illegal importations in the case were made, a civil action would have
been allowed. The issue in Claflin, however, was whether the statute was actually in force when the alleged violations had occurred.
The Court held that the statute was not in force, and had been repealed by the enactment of a later statute. The later statute, 10 5 like
the statute in ourden, contained no evidence whatever of a congressional intent to allow civil proceedings. There certainly was no
mention of informers, nor was there a provision providing that a
moiety of the fine go to a citizen.
The key to both Jourden and Claflin is twofold. First is their
failure to establish any method for deciding when a particular statute
allows only criminal prosecution, rather than civil and criminal proceedings together. Once it is decided that a statute is purely criminal, it is not difficult to hold that the legislature did not authorize
civil proceedings as well. But Jourden and Claflin supply only this
truism and no more; they are worthless in deciding what enforcement mechanisms are proper under a particular penal statute. Second is the total absence in the statutes involved in these cases of any
factor upon which to base a conclusion that civil actions were authorized. Where a penal statute does contain some evidence of civil
intent, courts do allow actions in debt regardless of the fact that criminal prosecution is also allowed. In United States v. Zucker, 0 6 for
example, the United States had filed a civil action of debt against
importers under a statute which read in part:
[I]f any owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person shall

...be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the
United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties or any portion
thereof, accruing upon the merchandise... such merchandise or the
value thereof . . . shall be forfeited . . . and such person shall,
upon conviction, be fined for each offence a sum not exceeding
five thousand dollars, or be imprisoned for a time not exceeding two
107
years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The Government had attempted to introduce a deposition into evidence and the defendant objected, contending that the action against
him for violation of the statute was exclusively criminal and that the
sixth amendment granted him the right to confront the witnesses
against him. But the Court concluded that the penal statute involved
was not purely criminal, and consequently allowed the use of the
deposition:
10 5 Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 4, 14 Star. 179.
106 161 U.S. 475 (1896) (opinion by Harlan, J.).
07
Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 9, 26 Star 131, 135 (Customs Administration
Act) (emphasis added).
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A witness who proves facts entitling the plaintiff in a proceeding in

a court of the United States, even if the plaintiff be the government,
to a judgment for money only, and not to a judgment which directly involves the personal safety of the defendant, is not, within

the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, a witness against an "accused" in a criminal prosecution ....

The defendant, in such a

case, is no more entitled to be confronted at the trial with the witnesses of the plantiff than he would be in a case where the evidence

related to a claim for money that could be established without dis08
closing any facts tending to show the commission of crime.'

These three decisions, Jourden, Claflin, and Zucker, show that
although statutes having no civil features at all contemplate criminal enforcement exclusively - where a statute does contain civil attributes or evidence of congressional intent that civil actions are authorized, such actions are allowed even though criminal prosecution
is clearly possible under the same statute. Section 16 does contain
something not found in a purely criminal statute; it contains a clause
for informers. A court cannot ignore that fact and treat the clause
as nonexistent. Moreover, a court must reckon with other factors
that weigh in favor of civil recovery and which will be discussed
below. Once there exists some evidence that criminal prosecution
might not have been intended as the sole mode of procedure, a court
must search for the legislative intent behind that evidence to decide
whether or not a civil action will lie. Jourden and Claflin are of
no help in that investigation.
Some courts denying qui tam actions under the Rivers and Harbors Act have relied upon section 17,19 rather than the JourdenClaflin argument. These courts have implicitly acknowledged the
possibility of civil actions under section 16, but have held that section 17 negates the possible inference that Congress intended to allow
private citizens to sue under section 16. Section 17 provides, in part:
-

[T]he Department of Justice shall conduct the legal proceedings
necessary to enforce the provisions of [sections 13 and 16] . . . ;
and it shall be the duty of United States attorneys to vigorously
prosecute all offenders against the same whenever requested to do so

by the Secretary of the Army or by any of the officials hereinafter
designated ....

110

In disallowing qui tam actions, the courts have read the two sections
108 161 U.S. at 481. The court further stated that an action could not be criminal if
only a judgment for money was sought. Id.
10 9
See Gerbing v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., ___ F. Supp.
[2 ERC 1801] (M.D. Fla.
1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D.
Tenn. 1971); Enquist v. Quaker Oats Co., 327 F. Supp. 347-48 (D. Neb. 1971); United
States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87, 91-92 (D. Minn. 1971).
110

33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
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together and have held that section 17 establishes that Congress authorized criminal prosecution as the sole method of enforcement for
the entire Act. A close analysis, however, will show that section

17 has essentially no relevance when looking to section 16 for qui
tam authorization. Section 17 obviously authorizes the government
to prosecute criminally, but the question is whether Congress intended that mode of enforcement to be exclusive, and not simply
whether the Government can criminally prosecute.
In United States v. Griswold"' a situation existed very similar
to that under sections 16 and 17. An informer had sued under the
Informers Act of March 2, 1863 to recover the penalty proscribed
therein. 1 2 In separate sections, the Informers Act established two
modes of enforcement, one a criminal prosecution" 3 and the other
an action by an informer." 4 Two other statutes involved in Griswold, one of a specific and the other of a general nature, directed
each United States District Attorney to be diligent in enforcing the
substantive statute"1 5 and to prosecute "all civil actions in which the
United States [was) concerned." 1 6 The defendant in Griswold
moved to vacate the writ of arrest on the grounds that these latter
statutes mandated the Federal Government alone to prosecute, to the
exclusion of qui tam informers. The Griswold court held that neither
statute could support the inference that criminal prosecutions were
17
the only means of enforcement contemplated.
The fact that the district attorney is [specifically] required to be

diligent to enforce the statute against persons violating it, does not
make him the attorney of the United States in that action ....
[Nor] does the [general provision] which makes it the duty of the
126 F. Cas. 42 (No. 15,266) (D. Ore. 1877).

2
REV. STAT. §§ 3490-93, 5438, Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 1, 3-6, 12 Stat.
698, codified as 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-34 (1964).
n REv. STAT. § 5438, Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67 §§ 1, 3, 12 Stat. 696, 698,
codified as 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1971).
114 REv. STAT. § 3493, Act of March 2, 1863, ch.67, § 6, 12 Star. 698, repealed by
Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, § 2, 57 Star. 609.
115 REV. STAT. § 3492, Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 5, 12 Star. 698, codified as
31 U.S.C. § 233 (1971).
116 REV. STAT. § 771 revised and codified as 28 U.S.C. 507 (1971). In construing
section 771, the court said: "This action is general in terms and necessarily qualified
and restrained by the sections above cited, which relate to the commencement and conduct of this particular action." 26 F. Cas. at 44.
117 Responding to defendant's contention that, since the United States was entitled
to part of the penalty, and since government attorneys were commanded to prosecute, a
private plaintiff could not enforce the statute, the court stated: "[A] qui tam action is
the action of the party who brings it, and the sovereign, however much concerned in
the result of it, has no right to interfere with the conduct of it, except as specifically provided by statute ....
" 26 F. Cas. at 44.

1
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"district attorney to prosecute in his district
all civil actions in
which the United States are concerned," authorize or require him to
act as attorney for the plaintiff in this action .... 118
Moreover, because the United States was "concerned" in all qui tam

actions under federal penal statutes, the court noted that to read provisions authorizing criminal prosecution as authorizing criminal prosecution alone would undercut qui tam provisions in general, and
this result was completely unsupportable and undesirable.

The similarity between Griswold and the Rivers and Harbors situation is compelling. The Informers Act instructed district attorneys "to be diligent in inquiring into any violation . . . and to cause
violators to be proceeded against," language quite similar to that used
in section 17. Thus, in allowing the qui tam action, the Griswold
court laid down an important guiding principle. The court recognized that if a qui tam action was authorized, then any other mode
of procedure specified was cumulative and did not supercede the civil
action. Accordingly, the language of section 17 should be ignored
in deciding whether a qui tam action is authorized under section 16.
The language of section 17 should be treated, under the Griswold
approach, not as the specification of an exclusive mode of procedure,
but a mere legislative direction that criminal prosecutions can be
maintained in addition to any other method of enforcement authorized under the Act.
There are other cases where courts have taken language which
might imply that a particular mode of procedure was intended and
have held that, in fact, no special procedure was intended. Traditional judicial doctrine has been reluctant to give such restrictive
readings to the provisions of penal statutes that control the enforcement mechanisms, as opposed to the substantive provisions. 9 In
Adams, qui tam v. Woods, 2 9 for example, the Court was faced with
a statute that provided that each violator would pay "one moiety [of
the fine] to the use of the United States, and the other moiety to
the use of him or her who shall sue for and prosecute the same."''
This statute provided no express authorization for criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Marshall stated that "either debt
or information [would lie because] the statute which [created] the
118 Id.

110 See, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
Act of March 22, 1794, § 2, 1 Stat. 347. In responding to the plaintiff's argument that the criminal statute of limitations, 1 Stat. 119, did not apply, Chief Justice
Marshall commented:
120
1
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forfeiture [did] not prescribe the [exclusive] mode of demanding
it .... -122 The statute in Adams is certainly less capable of being
read as authorization for several methods of enforcement than are
sections 16 and 17. Applying the Adams result to the Rivers and
Harbors Act, section 17 cannot, a fortiori, limit section 16 and establish the exclusive remedy of criminal proceedings.
In contrast to the traditional doctrine typified by Griswold and
Adams, courts dismissing section 16 qui tam actions have typically
cited the following proposition: "[Elven where some statutory language seems to grant a private right of action, if the same or a related statute also dearly places enforcement in the hands of governmental authorities the right of action is exclusively vested in such
governmental authority." 1 3 Courts which assert this proposition invariably cite as authority Williams v. Wells Fargo & Co. w' and
Rosenberg v. Union Iton Works 125 and they point to section 17 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act as such an explicit vesting of exclusive
authority.' 26 A careful analysis leaves no doubt that this approach
is spurious.
The proposition of "exclusive vesting" was originally written in
Allen v. Craig'27 and, in fact, never specifically appeared in either
Williams or Rosenberg. It is not hard to understand why Allen is
never cited directly because it deals only with whether a qui tam
plaintiff must sue in his own name or in the name of the government
when none of the recovery is earmarked for his use,'2 8 a totally separate issue from whether he can sue at allJ129 Moreover, a perusal of
Williams and Rosenberg shows that, in both, the situation was far
clearer and more precise than that under section 16, as far as deterMo declare that the information was barred, while the action of debt was left
without limitation, would be to attribute a capriciousness on this subject to the
legislature, which could not be accounted for; and to declare that the law did
not apply to cases on which an action of debt is maintainable, would be to
overrule express words, and to give the statute almost the same construction
which it would receive, if one distinct member of the sentence were expunged
fromit. 6U.S. (2 Cranch) at341.
1226 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 341.
123 E.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. SuppL
412, 415 (S.D. Ala.), afi'd ---F.2d ---[3 ERC 1065] (5th Cir. 1971).
124 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910).
125 109 F. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1901).
126 See, e.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F.
Supp. 412 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd ---F.2d ---[3 ERC 1065] (5th Cir. 1971). Reuss v.
Moss-Am., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
127 102 Ore. 254,201 P. 1079 (1921).
128 d. at 258-60, 201 P. at 1081.
12 9 See generally Annor., 50 AM. ST. EP. 557 (1896).
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mining legislative intent is concerned. Consequently, there is no
guidance available from these cases for the more equivocal situation
under sections 16 and 17.
In Williams, one statute provided: "[A]ll penalties and forfeitures imposed for any violation of law affecting the Post Office Department, its revenues or property, shall be recoverable one half to the
use of the person informing and prosecuting for the same . . . unless
a different disposal is expressly prescribed . . . . ,0 A later statute
was passed which mandated that "[the Sixth Auditor [of the Treasuryl shall superintend the collection of . . . all penalties and forfeitures imposed for any violation of the postal laws .... ,11' The
court in Williams had no choice but to obey this clear expression of
legislative intent and allow the Auditor alone to act; to allow the
civil action would have rendered the entire second statute meaningless.
In Rosenberg the statute contained language from which the authority to bring a qui tam action could have been inferred. The only
language that could have weighed against a qui tam action appeared
in the concluding sentence of the statute, which stated that "[ilt shall
be the duty of the district attorney . . . to prosecute every such suit
at the expense of the United States.'1 3 ' But even more important
than this inconsistency was an amendment to the statute which read:
[The Secretary of the Treasury shall] pay to an informer who furnishes original information that the law has been violated such share
of the penalties recovered as he may deem desirable and just, not
exceeding fifty per centum, when it appears that the recovery was
had in consequence of the information thus furnished. 133
As in Williams, the only alternatives open to the court were to dismiss the civil action or to render the amendment meaningless. No
interpretation could have rendered the statute and the amendment
compatible, but no such situation arises under the Rivers and Harbors
Act. Williams and Rosenberg are completely irrelevant in the present situation because sections 16 and 17 do not present such a simple
clash. Section 17 does not become irrelevant if section 16 were
read to allow qui tam actions because it would still serve as the authorization for the government prosecutions.'
130 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 292, 325 (emphasis added).
131 REV. STAT. § 292, codified as 31 U.S.C. § 109, repealed by Act of Aug. 17, 1950,

ch. 735, § 10(a) (2), 64 Stat. 462 (emphasis added).
132 Act of Feb. 26, 1885, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, as amended Act of Oct. 19, 1888, 25
Stat. 565 (emphasis added).
133 Act of Oct. 19, 1888, 25 Stat. 565.
134 There is no mandate in section 17 that all or every prosecution be handled by
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Rosenberg, in fact, weighs more in favor of qui tam proponents
than against. Because the amendment in Rosenberg was enacted a
mere two years before the Rivers and Harbors Act was passed, Congress clearly knew how to differentiate between a reward for information - which some contend is all that the section 16 informer
provision authorizes 3 5 - and authority to sue. If a reward was all
that was intended, it would have been an easy matter to phrase it
similar to the statute in Rosenberg. Since Congress used the language it did, rather than the Rosenberg type of language, the case
for qui tam actions under section 16 is strengthened.
Thus, there seems to be no legal doctrine supporting the position
that section 16 should bz read, alone or in conjunction with section
17, as permitting nothing other than criminal proceedings. But the
most compelling reason for rejecting this position comes from Supreme Court decisions under the Rivers and Harbors Act which specifically hold that section 16 authorizes more than criminal proceed3 6 the Govings. In Wyandotte TransportationCo. v. United States"
7
ernment sued for injunctive relief in two cases of libel1 arising out
of the negligent sinking of vessels in navigable waters in violation of
section 10 of the Act. 138 The defendant contended that section 16
declared criminal prosecution the only acceptable remedy, exclusive
of all civil actions. The Court strongly disagreed and wrote:
Petitioner's interpretation of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
would ascribe to Congress an -intent at variance with the purpose of
that statute. Petitioner's proposal is, moreover, in disharmony with
our own prior construction of the Act, with our decisions on analogous issues of statutory construction, and with a major maritime
statute of the United States ....
[Ojur reading of the Act does
not lead us to the conclusion that Congress must have intended the
[express] statutory remedies and procedures to be exclusive of all
others. . . . We therefore hold that the remedies and procedures
specified -by the Act for the enforcement of section 15 were not intended to be exclusive.' 3 9
Government prosecution; only the command that where certain specified government
officials act as complainants, see 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964), or where public prosecutors
act on information provided by the public at large, see United States v. Interlake Steel
Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. I1. 1969), then criminal proceedings brought to enforce
violations of section 16 must be controlled by the Justice Department.
135 See, e.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F.
Supp. 412, 415 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd
F-- --- [3 ERC 10653 (5th Cir. 1971).
F.2d
136 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
'37 See, e.g., United States v. Cargill, Inc., 1964 A.M.C. 1742, rev'd, 367 F.2d 971
(1966), aff'd 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
38 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1964).
139

389 U.S. at 200-01.
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In granting the injunction and allowing a civil action under the Act,
the Court summarized the situation and stated that "the inadequacy
of the criminal penalties explicitly provided by section 16 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act is beyond dispute."'"4
It is difficult to understand how the lower courts have been able
to boldly state that sections 16 and 17 prescribe criminal proceedings as the sole remedy in the face of such contrary authority. It is
also interesting that these courts take the strictest approach
(holding that criminal proceedings are the sole authorized remedy),
rather than the compromise one (holding that civil actions are allowed, but only when instituted by the Government). The latter
approach would no longer be incompatible with Republic Steel, but
the reason for shunning it in favor of the untenable strict position
becomes apparent when one extends the logic of the compromise
position. Once it is admitted that civil actions can be brought by
the Government, the exclusive-proceedings arguments are completely
deflated because they depend upon the preclusion of all civil actions.
When some civil actions are allowed, the Jourden and Claflin cases
are totally inapposite, and the section 17 argument meets a similar
fate. To read section 17 as prohibiting civil actions by citizens can
be done consistent with the language of that section only if civil actions by the Government are prohibited as well. The lower courts
have apparently realized that their rationales become even more
tenuous when they abandon the strictest approach, and they have
4
instead chosen to ignore the statements in Republic Steel.1 1
Thus, section 17 can play no legitimate role in deciding whether
section 16 authorizes qui tam suits. There is no basis whatsoever for
holding that criminal proceedings are deemed exclusive by section
17 and section 16 must be considered alone in looking for the con140 Id. at 202. One of the more interesting features of this decision is the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan who had dissented in all the other major opinions
involving the construction of the Rivers and Harbors Act. United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966) (Harlan, J.,dissenting); United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 493 (1960) (Harlan, J.,dissenting). In Wyandotte Mr.
Justice Harlan wrote:
In reaching these conclusions, I have not been unmindful of the view stated by
me in dictum in my dissenting opinion in United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 493, to the effect that the courts are precluded from supplying relief not expressly found in the Rivers and Harbors Act. Insofar as
that dictum might be taken to encompass the present case, where, contrary to my
view in Republic Steel, I do believe that the [injunctive] relief afforded by
this Court is fairly to be implied from the statute, candor would compel me to
say that the dictum was ill-founded. 389 U.S. at 211.
141 The most obvious anomalies are the recent decisions under the Rivers and Harbors Act.
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gressional intent to permit or prohibit qui tam actions. Although
the Jourden and Claflin cases are of no legitimate value in ascertaining the congressional intent, the next section will show that
well-established methods are available for pursuing this inquiry.
C. The Rules of Construction Applicable to Section 16
The foregoing discussion has resolved several important points
necessary to a determination of whether a qui tam action is autho.
iized under section 16. First, the language used in the section is not
indicative of whether or not a qui tam action is permitted. Ii particular, this language - which includes "fine," and "misdemeanor"
- does not support the inference that criminal proceedings -aloie
are authorized. Second, section 17, which relates to government enforcement of the Act, is not germane in considering qui tam actions
under section 16. And finally, criminal proceedings are not the sole
mode of enforcing section 16.
Given these preconditions, there is one particular test that can
be used to ascertain the legislative intent under section 16 that is
consistent with almost all qui tam case law. This test dictates that,
if a penal statute (1) imposes a pecuniary penalty, (2) labels the
offense less than a felony,142 (3) allows proceedings other than
criminal prosecutions as enforcement mechanisms, and (4) provides
that some portion of the recovery goes to an informer, then the informer will be allowed to prosecute an alleged violator in a qui tam
action to collect his share of the recovery, unless expressly prohibited
by statute. One of the more obvious values of this test is the certainty with which it can be applied 4 8 and relied upon by legislatures.144 Applying it to section 16, it is evident that each of the four
requirements are satisfied. The following discussion will establish
that this test is th6roughly consistent with the general history of the
informer action and the legal doctrine surrounding its statutory authorization.
Probably the most obvious feature of this test is its liberal atti142 There is no reason in American law why an offense labeled a felony could not
be the subject of a qui tax action. But no such case has been uncovered, which simply
reflects the tradition that minor offenses were the subjects of qui tam actions.
143 One of the problems of the decisions dismissing section 16 qui tam actions is
their clear failure to provide an alternative test that has some degree of predictability.
The opinions in these cases generally reflect ad hoc conclusions, unsupported by legal
doctrine.
144 It will be shown in the following discussion that this test antedated the Rivers
and Harbors Act. See notes 157-70 infra & accompanying text. Consequently, to apply another test would frustrate the effort to elucidate the intent of Congress. "
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tude towards qui tam actions. The test does not require that the
legislature expressly authorize qui tam actions and, instead, the action is held to be impliedly authorized whenever the several specified
conditions are present. This liberal attitude should not be surprising, for it is entirely compatible with general Anglo-American legal
doctrines. It is a traditional rule of statutory construction that the
substantive provisions of penal statutes be narrowly construed,' 45
but no such restrictive approach has ever been applied when reading
the enforcement provisions of penal statutes. The rationale for
reading substantive provisions narrowly is simple - to do otherwise
and go beyond what is reasonably apparent from the face of a statute is unfair because an individual could not have known before
the decision that his conduct was proscribed.14 But this rationale is
inapplicable when considering technical differences in enforcement
mechanisms because the substantive provisions alone prescribe which
conduct is permitted and which is prohibited. There is no apparent
injustice in broadly construing the remedial, or enforcement provisions of a statute because the defendant has, with fair notice, conducted himself outside the laws. A liberal reading of the enforcement provisions is especially unobjectionable, from the defendant's
viewpoint, where the only issue is the type of proceeding that may be
used to collect a pecuniary fine. The qui tam question under section
16 is solely whether a citizen can bring suit, in addition to the Government. Allowing a qui tam plaintiff to sue would not subject a
defendant to any kind of punishment to which he is not otherwise
subject.
Throughout its development, the qui tam mode of enforcing
penal statutes has been an important adjunct of criminal law,' 4' and
it is incumbent upon the courts to recognize this historical relationship in construing enforcement provisions. Every reasonable presumption in favor of an efficacious method of enforcement is imperative if the substantive provisions of penal statutes are to be of the
value intended by the legislatures. This liberal interpretative ap145 See, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
Even when not dealing with penal statutes, the courts have been careful to decide
substantive issues in a way that does not create "unfair surprise." A classic illustration
of such an approach to primary duties is found in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). This same rationale is behind the principle
that substantive statutory enactments are prospective whereas procedural ones are retroactive.
146 As such, the principle of narrowly construing substantive provisions is arguably
a requirement of due process. Cf. Cardiff v. United States, 344 U.S. 174 (1952).
147 See notes 18-31 supra & accompanying text.
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proach has been widely accepted in qui tam actions, as will be shown
below, if only because a more restrictive one would be less compatible with the apparent legislative intent.
Throughout the legal history of the United States, courts and
commentators have suggested that a qui tam action is impliedly authorized by the mere mention of an informer in a proper penal
statute' 48 when coupled with the failure of the legislature to restrict
enforcement to criminal prosecution. 149 The most recent enunciation of this doctrine by the United States Supreme Court is contained
in Justice Black's opinion for the Court in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess.' n0 Marcus involved a suit by an informer to recover
penalties for the alleged violation of the Federal False Claims
Act. 1 In both Marcus and a companion case,18 2 the Government
had previously investigated the activities of the respective respondents and indicted them for conspiracy to defraud the United States.
The respondents chose not to contest the averments in the complaint and pleaded nolo contendere, resulting in the imposition of
heavy fines. While these criminal actions were still pending, the
petitioner and several others commenced qui tam actions in which
the allegations in their complaints were substantially copies of the
Government's criminal indictments. A hostile appellate court held
that the defendant could not be prosecuted in a civil action by an
informer who had done no more than copy a criminal indictment,
even though the defendant had concededly defrauded the government. 8 3 The appellate court went on to support its conclusion by
stating that qui tam actions had "always been regarded with disfavor"
by the courts.' -' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it could
not "accept either the interpretative approach or the actual decision
of the court below."'155 After noting that qui tam actions were in
fact an important part of America's legal heritage, and were not the
object of opprobrium by the judiciary, Justice Black stated the inter148 A "proper" penal statute is used here simply to mean one which meets the other
criteria listed above. See notes 53-71 supra & accompanying text.
149 In England, Parliament resorted to simply interjecting the word "informer" into
statutes to indicate that qui tam actions were allowed - rather than explicitly stating
that such an action could be brought. See 2 L. RADZiNoWIcZ supra note 12, at 146 nA9.
150 317 U.S. 537 (1943).

181 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-34 (1964).
152 United States ex rel. Ostrager v. Associates Gen. Contractors, Inc., 317 U.S. 562
(1943) (affirmed on the basis of Marcus).
153 127 F.2d 233 (1942).
154 ld.at 235.

155 317 U.S. at 541.
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pretative approach that should be used in determining whether informer's actions are authorized under a particular statute: "Statutes
providing for a reward to informers which do not specifically either
authorize or forbid the informer to institute the action are construed
to authorize him to sue .. 156 This statement clearly recognizes
the presumption in favor of allowing the qui tam mode of procedure
to enforce a penal statute; a presumption that stands unless the legislature clearly specifies that qui tam actions are not permissible
means of enforcement.
Further evidence of the favorable judicial attitude towards qui
tam actions is found well before passage of the Rivers and Harbors
Act, in Adams, qui tam v. Woods.157 The informer in Adams
charged the defendant with violating a statute which provided that
every violator would "forfeit and pay the sum of $2,000, one moiety
thereof to the use of the United States, and the other moiety to the
use of him or her who shall sue for and prosecute the same."'5 8 The
defendant argued that the criminal statute of limitations was applicable because either criminal or civil prosecution could arise under
the provision involved. Chief Justice Marshall agreed with the defendant, stating that "[a]Imost every fine or forfeiture under a penal
statute may be recovered by an action of debt, as well as by information . . . .In this particular case, the statute which creates the
forfeiture does not prescribe the mode of demanding it; consequently either debt or information would lie."'15
Some of the recent decisions under the Rivers and Harbors Act
have erroneously assessed Chief Justice Marshall's comment, holding
that it is mere dictum because the statute clearly prescribed a mode
of civil prosecution and the instant proceeding was a civil qui tam
action. 160 But in order to hold the criminal statute of limitations
applicable in Adams, the Court had to infer that criminal prosecution was a possible remedy. By stating that no particular remedy
had been prescribed, the Chief Justice was pointing to the crucial dis156 Id. at 541 n.4.
The specific holding of Marcus, that the mere copying of a
previously filed government indictment was sufficient to grant the informer a right to sue,
was reversed in 1943 by the enactment of 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(1). See Bayarsky v.
Brooks, 110 F. Supp. 175 (1953), aff'd 210 F.2d 257 (1954).
157 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
1 58
Act of March 22, 1794, § 2, 1 Stat. 347. (An Act to prohibit the carrying on
of the slave trade from the United States to any foreign place or country).

159 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 341.
160 See, e.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman's So'y v. United States Plywood-Champion
Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302, 306 (S.D. Tex. 1971); accord, United States ex rel. Matson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971).
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tinction between a statute which suggests a mode of prosecution
and a statute which the legislature intended could only be enforced by the suggested mode of prosecution. In the former instance, either criminal or civil prosecution is authorized; in the latter,
only the mode particularly stated may be pursued. The point alluded to by the Chief Justice is that in the vast majority of cases
the difference is found only in the intent behind the language used.
Recognizing the difficulty involved in discovering that intent, the
Adams Court stated the simple and general rule that almost every
fine or. forfeiture under a penal statute was recoverable by .a civil
action of debt, as well as by a criminal prosecution - thus holding
that the two alternative methods of enforcement (criminal prosecutions and qui tam actions) were presumed to coexist.
Stocking v. United States,61 decided near the time of passage of
the Rivers and Harbors Act, provides another illustration of the judicial inclination to allow qui tam actions as a mode of enforcing penal
statutes. In Stocking the United States had proceeded -by indictment against the defendant for allegedly violating an act prohibiting reentry into Indian territory after removal had been ordered. "2
The enforcement provision provided that "all penalties which shall
accrue under this act shall be sued for and recovered in an action of
debt in the name of the United States . . . one half to the use of the
informer, and the other half to the use of the United States .... 163
The defendant argued that an indictment would not lie because an
action of debt was the only expressly authorized mode of procedure.
But the court disagreed since Congress had not expressly excluded
criminal prosecution as a mode of enforcement. The Stocking court
discussed the test used to ascertain whether qui tam actions are authorized under particular statutes and concluded:
Under the provisions of [the enforcement section], an informer is
entitled to one-half of the penalty sued for .... Any words of a
statute which show that a part of the penalty named therein shall

be for the use of an informer will entitle him to maintain an action therefor ... 'While there is no express provision of the Revised statutes ... which gives an informer any part of the penalties

[provided], the provisions of [the enforcement sectionj impliedly
give him one-half of the said penalties ....

[Thus] this section

gives -him ... the right to sue therefor in the name of the United

States.i64
16187 F. 857 (D. Mont. 1898).
62
'
Act of June 30, 1834, § 10, 4 Stat. 730, as amended Act of August 18, 1856, §
2, 11 Stat. 80.
163 Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 27, 4 Star. 729, 733.
164 87 F. 861-62.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:173

The Stocking decision held that the provision providing for a moiety
to the informer - which is remarkably similar to the language of
section 16 - impliedly created the right to sue in a qui tam action.
Chicago & Alton Railway Co. v. Howard6 ' serves as a final useful illustration of the presumption in favor of qui tam actions, because here
again the sole indication in the statute that qui tam actions were
authorized was the mention that the informer would receive one-half
of the penalty.' 66 To read penal statutes in a way that makes them
as efficacious as possible, and hence to give them the effect most likely
intended by the legislatures, the courts have almost without exception followed this liberal attitude in allowing the qui tam mode of
enforcement.
Nowhere is this presumption in favor of qui tam actions better
evidenced than in a compendium of the case law made over 50 years
ago. 6 The author concluded that an informer could bring a qui
tam action in his own name to recover a statutory penalty, unless
the statute expressly prohibited him from doing so; otherwise the
penalty could be sued for only by the state. 6 8 The author went on
to discuss contrary authorities, several of which have been used in
recent decisions dismissing qui tam actions under the Rivers and
Harbors Act: 169
In some jurisdictions, the courts, relying upon common-law
cases, adhere to the common-law rule, that a common informer cannot maintain an action qui tam to recover a penalty, unless express
power is given to him for that purpose,1by the statute .... [T]hese
cases are contrary to the general rule. 70
Thus, both the case law and the commentators generally support
the rule stated above - that qui tam actions are allowed if part of a
pecuniary penalty is specified for an informer, unless the statute expressly prohibits this method of enforcement. The development of
this liberal rule is not surprising because of the attitude towards
remedial and enforcement provisions that prevails throughout American law. But even were this rule not a statement of the general
law, there are cogent reasons why it would at least apply in inter16538

Ill. 414 (1865).

166 Ill. Act of November 5, 1849, § 38.
167 Annot., supra note 129.
168 Id. at 558.
169 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp.
87 (D. Minn. 1971).
170 Annot., supra note 129, at 558. For cases improperly using the rule, see McDaniel v. Gate City Gas Light Co., 79 Ga. 58 (1887); Smith v. Look, 108 Mass. 139
(1871).
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preting section 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. First, the Supreme
Court has consistently made an expansive, liberal interpretation of
the Act's enforcement provisions, holding that such an approach is
necessary to effectuate its substantive purposes. And second, because
of the nature of its substantive provisions and the enforcement
problems under the Act, it is a perfect example of the kind of law
which Parliament and the American legislatures have deemed enforceable by common informers. Consequently, a liberal attitude
towards qui tam actions under section 16 is especially likely to reflect Congress' intent, and is especially unlikely to effect injustices or
thwart the intended scheme of enforcement.
The history of the Rivers and Harbors Act is dominated by broad
construction of all its provisions. In 1966 the Supreme Court indicated its attitude towards the Act in United States v. Standard Oil
Co. 7 ' when it stated:
This case comes to us at a time in the nation's history when there is
greater concern than ever over pollution - one of the main threats
to our free-flowing rivers and to our lakes as well. The crisis that
we face in this respect would not, of course, warrant us in manufacturing offenses where Congress has not acted nor in stretching
statutory language in a criminal field to meet strange conditions.
But whatever may be said of the rule of strict construction, it cannot
provide a substitute 'for common sense, precedent, and legislative
history. We cannot construe Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act in a vacuum. Nor can we read it as Baron Parke would read a
pleading. 17 2
Thus, the Supreme Court has noted the obvious environmental problems in the nation and has declared that the Rivers and Harbors Act
is going to be read liberally, enabling it to become one vehicle to
deal with these problems. In every instance in the last decade where
the Court has been asked to narrowly construe the Act, it has re73
fused..
In particular, the Court has expanded the enforcement mechanisms well beyond criminal prosecution, which is the only mechanism
expressly authorized in the Act. Enforcement mechanisms will be
provided when they are appropriate and are suggested by the Act,
even if not dearly provided for in the Act. In the words of the
171 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
172 Id.
73

at 225-26.
1 The treatment of the Rivers and Harbors Act by federal courts is detailed in Note,
The Refuse Act of 1899: Its Scope and Role in Control of Water Pollution, 58 CAL. L.
REV. 1444 (1971); Note, The Refuse Act: Its Role Within the Scheme of Federal Water
Quality Legislation, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV.304 (1971); Tripp & Hall, FederalEnforcement
Under the Refuse Act of 1899, 35 ALBANY L. Ray. 60 (1970).
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Court, "Congress has legislated and made its purpose clear; it has
provided enough federal law [in the Act] from which appropriate
remedies may be fashioned even though they rest on inferences.
Otherwise we impute to Congress a futility inconsistent with the
great design of this legislation.' 7 4 Taking Justice Holmes' philosophy of an earlier age that a "river is more than an amenity, it is a
treasure,' '1 7 5 the Court has time and again admonished that the Act
must be read "charitably in light of the purpose to be served."' 70
Given the Court's liberal attitude towards the Rivers and Harbors Act, one could cogently argue that qui tam actions are justified under section 16, irrespective of the rule of construction that favors the authorization of informers' actions. In effect, the Act has
been read to allow a particular enforcement mechanism if it is an
efficacious-way of carrying out the substantive provisions, and if the
text of the Act infers that such a mechanism might have been within
the intent of Congress. Obviously, this approach would allow qui
tam actions under section 16. The textual references are sufficient
to support an inference that Congress' intent was such, and the efficacy of the qui tam mode of enforcement in the kind of substantive
areas regulated by the Rivers and Harbors Act is unquestionable.
Qui tam actions arose because official forces were inadequate to
detect and prosecute certain statutory violations and because the executive was indifferent towards enforcement of certain statutes. Informer actions were particularly salutary when the violations were
minor and not easily detectable by normal police activity.17 7 Each
of these difficulties clearly pertains under the Rivers and Harbors
Act. Among the primary purposes of the Act was the goal of maintaining unobstructed waterways, which in turn would allow the free
Today, the Act has evolved
use of rivers for transportation.'
largely into an anti-pollution law,' 9 but in either case, the reasons
for allowing qui tam actions are compelling. The offenses are usually
minor, in comparison to crimes of physical violence, and the police
and prosecutorial staffs are presently reluctant to allocate much of
174 United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960).
175 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
176 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966); accord, United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 (1960).
177 See notes 18-31 supra & accompanying text.
178 This purpose is evident throughout the Act by the very language used. For example section 13 prohibits certain activities "whereby navigation shall or may be impeded
" 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
or obstructed ...
179 See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). See also
materials cited in note 8 supra.
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their time or resources to such problems. 180 In addition, the stated
policy of the executive branch is one of blatant apathy 8 1 despite a
Congressional mandate to "vigorously prosecute all offenders
• ..,,' It is precisely these difficulties that qui tam actions were designed to remedy.
Thus, whatever approach is taken, section 16 should be read to
allow qui tam actions. The courts, for a variety of reasons, have
generally applied a liberal test in deciding whether a particular statute authorizes qui tam actions. This test leads immediately to the
conclusion that an informer action is appropriate under the Rivers
and Harbors Act. As in the general case, the application of this test
under section 16 provides the most reasonable mechanisms to enforce the substantive aspects of the Act, thus ensuring that the purposes of Congress are carried out. Moreover, the liberal approach
raises no possibility of injustice because the qui tam issue is solely
one of who can bring suit, and not one of new substantive liabilities
or obligations. But notwithstanding this rule that allows qui tam
actions that seem impliedly authorized by a statute, but are not expressly authorized, the Supreme Court's decisions under the Rivers
and Harbors Act require the same result. The qui tam method of
enforcement is an efficacious, if not absolutely necessary method of
enforcing the substantive provisions of the Act. Thus, applying
the Court's traditionally permissive reading of this law to the practicalities of the situation, it again seems that the inference in section
16 should be read liberally to allow the actions to be maintained.

IV. DECISIONS IN THE COURTS
Every argument that has been raised in the recent Rivers and
Harbors decisions has been analyzed in detail in the preceding sections. Accordingly, there would be no value in scrutinizing each of
the cases individually in order to show where they fail. Instead,
this section of the Note will briefly comment on a few of the deci180 An excellent discussion of the role of the police in society is contained in THE
PRsmET'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967). See also. Address by Attorney General

John Mitchell, Attorney General's Conference On Crime Reduction in Washington,
D.C., Sept. 9, 1971.
18 1 See note 11 supra. It is especially important to note the political favoritism
that has characterized the Executive's enforcement of the Act. See Cleveland Press, Feb.
12, 1971, § G, at 8, col. 1. Such flagrantly discriminatory behavior would seem to
create an even stronger case for qui tam actions than a practice of complete non-enforcement.
1&2 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
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sions; for the most part, the reasoning in the other cases offers
nothing that is not illustrated by these examples.
On July 9, 1970, Marvin B. Durning and his wife filed the first
qui tam action of record under section 16 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act. 3 The complaint alleged that the defendant was responsible
for continuous discharges of waste material from its Port Angeles
Mill into navigable water of the United States in violation of section
13 of the Act. Defendant, I.T.T. Rayonier, Inc., moved for dismissal of the action contending that the plaintiff had failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. In perhaps the shallowest decision rendered on the subject, Judge Goodwin granted the defendant's motion in a short memorandum opinion, finding that the
plaintiffs had no standing to sue. Judge Goodwin read section 16
as authorizing solely criminal prosecutions:
This Court concludes that Congress in enacting this criminal statute
intended to reward an informant for information leading to the
conviction of a wrongdoer and not to provide a means by which an
informant may proceed to recover against the violator of the criminal statute the amount he might otherwise receive from a fine which
"might" be imposed after conviction of the defendant in a criminal
proceeding. 184
In the first place, the court cited no authority whatsoever for this
conclusion. It did not mention Marcus, which was cited in both
briefs,' 8 5 nor any other authority which discussed the nature of qui
tam actions. The court did not even bother tc explain why it
thought the statute was solely criminal. By initially assuming that
the statute was criminal and not penal, the court restricted itself to
the holding that public prosecution was the sole method of enforcement.
Other aspects of the Durning opinion show no better analysis of
the qui tam problem. For example, the court observed:
If plaintiff's contention is correct, the Court would be in the awkward position of determining priority between a criminal prosecu183 Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
184 Id. at 447. Judge Goodwin's emphasis on the word "might" in the quoted passage implies that the phrase "in the discretion of the court" in section 16 may modify the
clause following it, which provides for the moiety to the informer, rather than the clause
proceeding it, which provides for a fine, imprisonment or both. This contention, contrary to both common sense and the rules of legislative interpretation, was deemed
erroneous in United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., ___ F. Supp ___. (W.D. Wis. 1971).
See 33 C.F.R. § 209.170(f) (2) (Comp. 1971).
185 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Comp!aint and in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 4, 8, 16, 19 and Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Motion to Dismiss Action at 6, Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
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tion by the United States through the United States Attorney and a
civil suit under the same section by an informant. It would be unwould entertain both actions
reasonable to conclude that a Court
simultaneously or consecutively.' 86
This statement typifies the .general lack of knowledge which has
characterized the qui tam decisions under section 16. A full understanding of gui tam actions leaves no room for such fear of interference between the Government and private plaintiffs. First, the
Durning position ignores the settled mechanics of qui tam actions.
"IT]he rule of law is, and the practice has always been, that a qui
tam action is the action of the party who brings it, and the sovereign, however much concerned in the result of it, has no right to
interfere with the conduct of it, except as specially provided by statute."'u 7 Second, the potential for interference is irrelevant to the
issue to be decided - which is whether Congress intended to authorize qui tam actions. And in any case, the problem is wholly illusory
in actual practice. The Justice Department guidelines outlining the
official policy for prosecution under the Act state that "United States
Attorneys should take no position with respect to, or seek to intervene or appear as amicus curiae, in any qui tam action which may b2
brought under the supposed authority of the Refuse Act."'18 8 Thus,
the Justice Department has adopted a hands-off policy with respect
to citizens' qui tarn actions. Apparently the Government does not
envision that qui tam actions will hamper its "plans" to prosecute.
Moreover, the proper government officials have been informed of
the alleged violations in almost all the cases and have refused to act.
For example, Mr. Durning had submitted the information he eventually used in his suit to the Seattle District Attorney several months
earlier, but the Government failed to prosecute.18 Third, and perhaps most important, the fear of interference expressed by the Durning court could be used just as easily to deny qui tam actions even
if the legislature clearly authorized their use. This untenable conclusion proves the fallacy of the Durning rationale. The only quesis 325 F. Supp. at 447.

United States v. Griswold, 26 F. Cas. 42, 44 (No. 15,266) (D. Ore. 1877).
188 Guidelines for Litigation Under the Refuse Act, reprinted in 1 BNA ENVIRON.
RLEP., Current Devs. 288-90 (July 17, 1970).
187

180 Plaintiff had revealed all the evidence regarding defendant's alleged violations of
the Act as early as April, 1970. Seattle Post-Intelligence, April 14, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
Federal authorities often react slowly to information provided by qui tam plaintiffs.
See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint at 8, app., JackIovich v. Interlake, Inc., Civil No. 70-C2905 (N.D. Ill., filed Nov. 28, 1970), wherein the plaintiff maintains that he had informed officials of the defendant's alleged violation over one year prior to the initiation
of his informer action.
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tion before the court was whether section 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act was a penal statute which impliedly authorized suit by an
informer. 90
The decisions following Durning have failed in similar ways to
analyze qui tam theory. For example, in Bass Anglers Sportsman's
Society v. United States Steel Corp.,1"' the court found that "section
[13] established a crime and section [16] established criminal sanctions to be imposed for its violation," and that "criminal statutes
cannot be enforced by civil actions."1 2 Although at first glance the
court seems to have met the issue, it must be remembered that no
one contends that criminal actions are not allowed by the statute,
nor that criminal statutes can be enforced by civil actions. The
questions are whether, in addition to possible criminal prosecution,
civil actions can be brought under the Rivers and Harbors Act and
whether section 16 is a penal statute. The Alabama Bass Anglers
court did not say that criminal prosecution was the sole method of
enforcement, a fact which would have indicated an understanding
of the issue. Instead, the opinion elaborated on the problem in a
fashion that shows only confusion about the nature of a penal statute. For example, it spoke of the penalty as a "criminal fine" and
asserted that only "civil penalties or forfeitures" could be collected
by a qui tam action.103 But it has been shown that this proposition
is completely inapposite to a resolution of the question. 94 Moreover, this statement is simply incorrect. The historical relationship
between qui tam actions and criminal law - specifically crimes labeled misdemeanors - establishes that fines were definitely recoverable by this action. 9 ' And finally, like the court in Durning, the
Bass Anglers court ignored United States ex rel. Marcus v.Hess. 9 '
Bass Anglers relied instead on the untenable argument that section
17 specifies a sole mode of procedure. 9 '
In another case brought by the Bass Anglers Society, the opinion
did mention the Marcus decision. 98 But the court felt unrestrained
190 See 325 F. Supp. at 447.
191 324 F.Supp.412 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd --- F.2d ---[3 ERC 1065] (5th Cir. 1971).
192 Id. at 415.
193

Id.

194 See notes 80-93 supra & accompanying text.

195 See notes 18-3 1 supra & accompanying text.
196 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
197 324 F. Supp at 4 16 .
198 Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc.,
324 F. Supp. 302, 305-06 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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by Justice Black's statement and held that the Marcus test would
apply in certain circumstances, but not in construing section 16 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act. Neither legal authority nor convincing reasoning was given to justify this ad hoc limitation of Marcus.
Like its predecessors, the court relied solely on an inference that section 17 specified an exclusive mode of procedure. 9'
V.

CONCLUSION

None of the cases which have dismissed qui tam actions under
the Rivers and Harbors Act is sufficiently well-reasoned to finally
dispose of the qui tam issue. Each opinion has committed one or
more of the errors discussed in this Note. Perhaps because of the
expansive reading already given to the Rivers and Harbors Act, or
perhaps because of the fear of permitting what is today a relatively
uncommon form of action, the lower federal courts have been wary
of giving the Act additional impact in areas of environmental concern. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons, founded upon
general legal doctrine, policy, and Supreme Court decisions under
the Rivers and Harbors Act which seem to require that section 16 be
read to allow qui tam actions.
The Rivers and Harbors Act is precisely the kind of statute that
qui tam actions were most commonly used to enforce. The qui tam
action, with roots deep in Anglo-Saxoin criminal law, was generally
used to enforce violations of laws dealing with minor, hard-to-detect
offenses, such as trade or commerce violations, which were often
misdemeanors. The qui tam action was used as an alternative mode
of enforcement to criminal prosecution in order to compensate for
the inability or unwillingness of public officials to properly enforce
laws which the legislature had passed. The Rivers and Harboirs Act
is designed to protect trade and commerce and to prevent pollution.
It makes violation of the Act a misdemeanor, and is only selectively
and sporadically enforced by a Justice Department which does not
have the staff or funds to monitor violators, on the one hand, and
on the other is largely unwilling to enforce its provisions. The Act
meets all the requirements necessary to find a qui tam action: it
is a penal statute; it punishes offenses which wrong the public and it
does not correlate the recovery tdf the amount of damages wrought
by the violation, as does a remedial statute; and the offense is labeled a misdemeanor. The clause giving a moiety to informers appears only in section 16 although the Act has several other enforce3.9

Id. at 305.
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ment provisions. And finally, qui tam actions have been implied
under statutes worded similarly to section 16.
The fact that the Rivers and Harbors Act can be enforced by
criminal prosecution is not dispositive of whether it can be enforced
by any other mode of procedure. The traditional test used to ascertain legislative intent, as stated in United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess,200 clearly would allow a qui tam action to be implied under
section 16 since the informer is not expressly prohibited from bringing suit. Moreover, section 17 does not cloud the inference that
qui tam actions are authorized under the preceding section. More
than what appears in section 17 is required before it could be held
that only a single mode of procedure is authorized. This section
does not encompass "all" or "every" action brought under the statute and, in fact, is virtually identical to the statute in United States
v. Griswold which was held not to specify an exclusive mode of
procedure. 20 1 In cases that have allowed only one mode of procedure, there was no logical way to read the provisions involved
harmoniously and still allow alternative modes.2 °2 But sections 16
and 17 can be read harmoniously if the former is read as authorizing
civil and the latter as referring only to criminal prosecution.
Aside from the legal requirements for qui tam actions and the
theory under which they can be implied, the Supreme Court has invariably read the Rivers and Harbors Act broadly and has refused
every attempt to limit its application, scope, or effectiveness. In
expanding the ambit of the Act, the Court has done so in every instance on the premise that a liberal reading was necessary to the effective fulfillment of the purpose of protecting the environment.
The Court has particularly noted, in this connection, the inherent
weakness of the criminal penalties provided in the Act and has authorized injunctive relief, though not expressly granted by any of its
provisions. The approach of the Court in both expanding the Rivers
and Harbors Act and in favoring the use of qui tam actions, coupled
with the solid legal base from which the authority for such actions
are implied, clearly justify a finding that qui tam proceedings are
compatible with the language and the purpose of the Act.
Finally, apart from the legal rationales that support qui tam actions under section 16, there are persuasive policy reasons that weigh
200

317 U.S. 537 (1943).

20126 F. Cas. 42, 44 (No. 15,266)

(D. Ore. 1877).

202 See, e.g., Williams v. Wells Fargo & Express Co., 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910);

Rosenberg v. Union Iron Works, 109 F. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1901).
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in favor of the same condusion. Recent years have seen an increasing awareness within the judiciary of both the problems of pollution and the need for members of society to participate in the
solutions to those problems. Far-thinking legislators and capable
jurists have voiced concern over the hiatus between modern government and the governed and have advocated whoje-hearted and re°3
sponsible citizen involvement in areas directly concerning them.2
Few areas are of such direct and immediate concern to such a large
number of people as the environment. Many states 4 and the Federal Government0 5 have enacted, or are considering, a number of
bills designed to enhance the participation of the citizenry in the decisions of government concerning pollution control. Many courts
have also recognized the need for private actions to offset government recalcitrance, ineffectiveness or incapacity and, accordingly,
have allowed for an increase in the role of the individual in matters of environmental concern. Particularly notable is the willingness of modern courts to entertain far-reaching new legal theories
and to allow citizens to act as private attorneys general to enforce
the policies of anti-pollution statutes.20 6 To accomplish these ends,
courts have used varying rationales, often taking great liberties with
traditional concepts. The notions of standing, for example, have
203 See, e.g., J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACnON passim (Introduction by Sen. G. McGovern); Hearings on the Refuse Act Permit Program Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., set. 7, 1-219 (1971).
2 04
Statutes allowing suits by individuals and groups to protect the environment
have been introduced in Massachusetts, New York, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Michigan, and Ohio. Hearings on S. 3575 Before the Subcomm. of Energy, Natural Resources, and the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
set. 80, at 9 (1971) (Statement by Sen. G. McGovern).
205See S. 3575, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1971) (Introduced by Senators Phillip Hart
and George McGovern) ("An Act to Promote and Protect the Free Flow of Interstate
Commerce Without Unreasonable Damage to the Environment, To Assure that Activities which Affect Interstate Commerce will not Unreasonably Injure Environmental
Rights; To Provide A Right of Action For Relief For Protection of the Environment
From Unreasonable Infringement By Activities Which Affect Interstate Commerce, And
to Establish the Right of All Citizens to the Protection, Preservation, and Enforcement
of the Environment"); H.R. 16436, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) (Introduced by Rep.
Morris Udall; reintroduced in the 92d Cong. as S. 1032). Letter from Leonard Bickwit, Jr., a copy of which is on file at the Case Western Reserve Law Review Office. Congressman Michael J. Harrington has introduced several bills to strengthen the Rivers
and Harbors Act, one of which would amend the Act to expressly allow citizen qui tam
actions and to increase the pecuniary penalties which would be recoverable thereby. 1
BNA ENVIRON. REP., Current Devs. 368-69 (1971).
200 See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d.
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
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been greatly expanded to include a much larger class of aggrieved
persons.

20 7

The federal government, through a series of political machinations, has evinced a consistent and unrelenting refusal to enforce
the Rivers and Harbors Act effectively and has stated its intention to
hamper or dissuade attempts to effectively enforce the Act. The
Justice Department has gone so far as to publish guidelines stating
when and against whom the Act was to be selectively enforced and
has exempted those most obviously guilty from the possibility of
prosecution. In its latest attempt, the Justice Department, in league
with a White House largely strangled by corporate interests, has
announced an ingenuous program whereby the nations' polluters
are to submit applications for permits under the Act, rather than be
prosecuted, supposedly in order that their rape of the environment
might be monitored and eventually controlled. 0 8 But there is little evidence that this questionable program has prodded big business to even bother to apply for a permit, the bare minimum which
would exempt them from prosecution.0
From experience, the corporations have no reason to fear that the Act will be exercised
against them by the Government.
The attempts in the legislatures to enact statutes providing for
citizen involvement in the protection of the environment illustrate
that many view individual participation in the law as welcome, at
least in the area of pollution. Many leaders have recognized that
this is a time in history when men's juices boil over the assaults by a
few on their homes and surroundings. The failure of the administration to harness and channel the great resource of human energy
offered by friends of the environment deserves the disrespect of all.
Citizens have continually expressed a willingness to shoulder the
fallen burden and to help in every way to save our resources from
destruction. Under the Rivers and Harbors Act, it is up to the
judiciary, through reasonable legal analysis and sensitive construction, to provide a vehicle for fulfilling this goal.
ALLAN W.

MAY

207 See, e.g., Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 734 (1970);
Willner, Who Has Standing in Oregon to Defend the Environment?, 1 ENVIRON. LAW
44 (1970).
208 See the authorities cited in note 11 supra.
209 As of July 14, 1971, two weeks after the official deadline, less than 15,000 applications had been received by the Corps of Engineers. 1 BNA ENVIRON. REP., Current
Devs. 303, 455 (1971). The Corps had expected, at a minimum, approximately three
times this number on the basis of the number of companies who operate in violation of
the Act.

